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SUBSTITUTIONS, FIDEICOMMISSA AND
TRUSTS IN LOUISIANA LAW:
A SEMANTICAL REAPPRAISAL
John H. Tucker, jr.*
PART I: THE TEXTS
The shift of the principal source of wealth from immovable
to movable property largely represented by stocks and bonds
has made investment expertise a necessity of sound financial
policy. High estate and inheritance taxes have become a com-
pelling cause for estate planning, frequently involving the sep-
aration of income beneficiary from principal beneficiary.
These needs for intelligent financial management of prop-
erty and sound estate planning are frequently met in states
other than Louisiana by the trust device.
In Louisiana, trusts for individuals are of recent origin and
restricted operation, a condition brought about by its acceptance!
of the French prohibition against substitutions in its first civil
code adopted in 1808.
This prohibition against substitutions is contained in article
896 of the French Civil Code.
Article 1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code corresponds to
article 896 of the French Code, and is a repetition with editorial
mutation of the text of article 1507 of the Code of 1825, which
in turn reproduces article 40 of Book III of Title II of the Code
of 1808 (p. 216).1
*Member of Bar, Shreveport, Louisiana; President, Louisiana State Law
Institute.
1. Title II of Book III of the Civil Code of France "Donations and Testa-
ments" was adopted 3 May 1803, and promulgated ten days later. The Code as
a whole was adopted 21 March 1804.
On 31 March 1808 the Territorial Legislature of Orleans (now Louisiana)
adopted its first civil code with the title "A Digest of Laws Now in Force in
the Territory of Orleans." This code was followed by the Code of 1825, actually
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A comparison of the text of article 896 of the Code Napoleon
with the texts of the corresponding articles of the Louisiana
Code is a necessary prerequisite to the study. These texts read:
French Civil Code article 896:
"Substitutions are prohibited.
"Every disposition by which the donee, the instituted heir
or the legatee will be charged to preserve for and deliver 2
to a third person will be null even with regard to the donee,
the instituted heir or the legatee."
The French text of article 896 reads:
"Les substitutions sont prohibges.
"Toute disposition par laquelle le donataire, l'hritier
institug, ou le 16gataire, sera charge de conserver et de rendre
d un tiers, sera nulle, meme a l'gard du donataire, de l'hri-
tier institug, ou du I6gataire."
Article 1507 of the Code of 1825 and article 1520 prior to
the amendment of 1962, with inconsequential differences in
punctuation, read :
"Substitutions and fidei commissa are and remain pro-
hibited.
"Every disposition by which the donee, the heir or legatee
is charged to preserve for or to return a thing to a third
person is null even with regard to the donee, the instituted
heir or the legatee.
adopted April 12, 1824, 'but its promulgation was delayed because of printing
difficulties.
The present Civil Code is the result of an editorial revision adopted in 1870
(La. Acts 1870, No. 97). It is known as the Revised Civil Code.
The two earlier codes were written in French and translated into English,
sometimes erroneously, which is discussed hereafter. The Code of 1870 was
adopted in English only.
2. "Rendre," in the French text, is translated "Return" in the Complied Edi-
tion of the Civil Codes of Louisiana (Louisiana Legal Archives), and the present
tense is used instead of the future used in the French Civil Code, thereby con-
forming the translation to the English edition of the Louisiana Civil Codes of
1808, 1825 and 1870. But the 1808 and 1825 Codes were written in French and
translated into English by translators employed by the legislature. Their work
was not altogether satisfactory (as to Code of 1808), see Moreau Lislet's argu-
ment in rebuttal in Dufour v. Camfranc, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 675, 701 (La. 1822) and
in Egerton v. Third Municipality of New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437 (1846) ;
see also Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals Written in French; Errors
of Translation), 25 LA. BARt A.R. 143 (1924).
The French text of the corresponding article of the Louisiana Codes of 1808
and 1825 uses the present tense, and no doubt the translators for the Compiled
Edition of the Louisiana Civil Codes thought and properly so that this interversion
was unimportant and justified for comparative purposes.
SUBSTITUTIONS
"In consequence of this article, the Trebellianic portion
of the Civil Law, that is to say the portion of the property
of the testator which the instituted heir had a right to de-
tain, when he was charged with a fidei commissa or fiduciary
bequest is no longer a part of our law."
The French text of article 1507 of the Code of 1825, and
article 40, p. 216, of the Code of 1808 (with inconsequential
changes) reads:
"Les substitutions et les fidei-commis sont prohib6s.
"Toute disposition, par laquelle le donataire, l'h6ritier ou
le lgataire est charge de conserver et de rendre d un tiers, est
nulle, meme ( l'egard du donataire, de l'h6ritier institu6, ou
du I6gataire. Au moyen du contenu en cet article, il n'y aura
plus lieu t la quarte tr6bellianique en usage dans la loi civile
c'est-d-dire, 4 la portion des biens du testateur, que l'h6ritier
institu6 avait le droit de retenir, lorsquil etait chargg d'un
fideicommis."
Here it should be noted that the translated English versions
of the Louisiana Codes differ from the French versions of the
Codes of 1808 and 1825 in several respects, which will be dis-
cussed later in this study. They are of some importance to this
re-examination of this question of Louisiana law.3
There can be but little doubt that the commissioners who
prepared the Code of 1808 had the text of what is now article
896 of the Code Napoleon before them. In nearly every respect,
the texts are identical.
But when they added to the first sentence "et les fidei-
commis," so as to make it read: "Les substitutions et les fidei-
commis sont prohibgs," they brought about a veritable phan-
tasmagoria of judicial and professional speculation which justi-
fies an extensive excursion back to sources and derivative texts
to ascertain the meaning of the terms "substitutions" and
"fideicommissa" as they were developed and applied in Roman,
Spanish, and French law and accepted in the Louisiana Civil
Code.
This prohibition was given constitutional stature in the Con-
stitution of 1921,4 but with an exception permitting trust estates
3. See note 2 supra.
4. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16. It was amended in 1962. It will be discussed
later. See p. 472 infra.
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for a limited period. There has been legislation permitting
trusts within constitutional limits,5 but the confusion resulting
from the redundant use of the terms "substitutions" and "fidei
commissa" has made the interpretation and application of these
laws difficult and restricted, and sometimes uncertain.
I believe that a comprehensive and critical study of the
sources and historical development of substitutions and fidei-
commissa in the civil law is of compelling importance.
For if it can be established that the term fideicommissum,
as it was used and understood in the laws of France and of
Spain when they respectively applied to Louisiana, was included
in the term substitution, and was in fact the very substitution
that was permitted in Spain by Las Siete Partidas, but which
was first suppressed in France during the Revolution and then
by article 896 of the Code Napoleon, there will be no basis what-
soever for the restrictive jurisprudence founded on the erro-
neous belief that they are not the same thing.6
This inquiry will, therefore, be made first into Roman law,
then into the laws of Spain and France, which on this subject
were derived directly from Roman law, and finally into the law
of Louisiana, their lineal descendant. Afterwards a comprehen-
sive critique will be made of the jurisprudence and professional
writing that this tautological sentence has inspired, upon the
basis of this semantical reappraisal of the texts.7
Roman Law
The Roman Law with which we are concerned is not the law
as it existed at the fall of the Western Empire in 476. It is
true that the Teutonic conquerors, following the principle of
the personality of laws, adopted two codifications of Roman law
for their Roman subjects in Spain and Southern France (Lex
Romana Visigothorum, also called Breviary of Alaric in 506)
and in Southeastern France (Lex Romana Burgundiorum 467-
516). These codifications were based largely on the Theodosian
5. A chronological list of Louisiana acts authorizing and regulating trusts
will appear in Part II hereof.
6. I realize that it may seem temerarious to thus enter the lists against the
host of scholars and judges that have adorned the profession throughout so many
years who have written otherwise. But I have been unable to find in the authori-
ties available to me any evidence to refute my thesis. So far I have found in my
investigation of Louisiana jurisprudence very few references to most of the essen-
tially important sources that are cited herein. I believe they were not generally
available in Louisiana at critical times in the development of this jurisprudence.
7. This critique will appear in a later issue of this Review as Part II hereof.
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Code of 438, and an abridgment of the Institutes of Gaius, The
Sententiae of Paulus and a fragment from Papinian.
These codes related principally to imperial enactments and
contained but little of the wealth of the juristic writings of the
classical period. These Visigothic codifications of ante-Justinian
law had little effect in the development of the civil law of Spain
and France that is founded on the works of Justinian, intro-
duced there following the revival of Roman law at the Univer-
sity of Bologna in the twelfth century.
But the ante-Justinian Roman law concerned with the sub-
ject of this study, as revealed in the Institutes of Gaius,8 must
be used as a starting point, in order to understand the origin
and development of substitutions and the fideicommissum as
they are established in Justinian's great codification.
A. Substitutions
In Roman law there were only two basic substitutions- the
vulgar substitution and the pupillary substitution, with the
exemplary substitution developing analogically from the latter,
and modifications or combinations producing some others deriva-
tive from these basic classes.
The vulgar substitution, so-called because of the frequency
of its use, was simply the means by which a testator could pre-
vent intestacy by naming a substitute for an heir or legatee
first named who might not succeed because of his predecease,
renunciation, or incapacity to receive the succession. This sub-
stitution is fully recognized in the Code Napoleon (Article 898)
and in the Civil Code of Louisiana (Article 1521). 9
8. The Institutes of Gaius, at the critical times discussed in this study, like
the works of practically all of the classical Roman jurists, were known only so
far as they could be reconstructed from attribution made in Justinian's codifica-
tions, particularly in his Digest or Pandects, and in his Institutes, acknowledged
to have been derived more than half from Gaius' Institutes.
A palimpsest of Gaius' Institutes of the 5th or the 6th century was found at
Verona in 1816, and laboriously deciphered by 1874 and published in 1884 (See
2 ZULUETA, INSTITUTES OF GMUS 1-11 (1953) ; and GAII, INSTITUTONIUM JURIS
CWILIS, Preface (Poste's Transl. 3d ed. 1890).) This discovery confirmed the
scholarship of the earlier reconstructions, evidenced in many of the earlier French
authorities mentioned through this discussion. Gaius' Institutes was written
about 161 A.D. Justinian's Institutes was published as a statute in November
533.
Moyle's annotated translation of the Institutes of Justinian (5th ed. 1916)
makes it easy to determine the contributions made by Gaius, by printing in heavy
type that of the text taken from Gaius. 10 POTHIER, PANDECTs DE JUSTINIAN
521; see also COIN-DELISLE, COMMENTAIRE DU TITRE DES DONATIONS .ET TESTA-
MENTS 7, 8 (new ed. 1855).
9. (A) INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, Book II, §§ 174-178, Substituto Vulgaris; 1
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The pupillary substitution was that by which a father in-
stituted an heir to the child under his authority in the event
he die after becoming heir but before attaining testamentary
capacity- Pothier says it comes from the law of the XII
Tables. 10
The exemplary substitution was that by which a parent in-
stituted a substituted heir for his child of unsound mind who
died before recovering his sanity. It is so-called because it was
introduced after the manner of the pupillary substitution.
Pupillary and exemplary substitutions were undoubtedly ef-
fective in Louisiana during the Spanish regime, for they are
included in the Siete Partidas in Title V of Partida VI under
the Rubric, "Substitutions," as will be more fully discussed here-
after.
They may have been effective under the French colonial
regime, when Louisiana was under French pre-revolutionary
law, by oblique derivation from Roman law, for that law was
often used as a supplement to the Customs when they were
silent. The Custom of Paris was effective in Louisiana during
the French Colonial period.
These substitutions are found today in the codes in many
countries of the civil law which derive their laws from Spanish
legal institutions.
The point here is that in the Roman law the word "substitu-
tion" was applied only to the kinds of substitution above de-
scribed. Substitution was not the name applied to the device
by which a testator charged his donee, instituted heir, or legatee
to preserve and deliver the bequest to a third person. We call
such a bequest a prohibited substitution, the French writers call
it a "substitution fideicommissaire," or simply a "fideicommis"
and the Romans called it a "fideicommissum."
B. Fideicommissa
About the end of the Republic, a testator in Rome, in order
ZULUETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 117, (Commentary) Vol. 2, at 104; PoSTE,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 244. (B) INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book II, Title XV,
De Vulgari Substitutione; SANDARS, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 270 (1st Am.
ed. of 5th London ed. 1876) ; MOYLE, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 73 (5th ed.
1913) ; MOYLE, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN ANNOTATED 270 (5th ed. 1913).
10. (A) INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, Book II, §§ 179-184, Substitutio Pupillaris;
ZULUETA, op. cit. supra note 8, Vol. 1, at 117, (Commentary) Vol. 2, at 105;
POSTE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 246. (B) INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book II,
Title XVI, De Pupillari Substitutione; SANDARS, Op. Cit. supra note 9, at 74;
MOYLE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 74; (Annotated) ; op. cit. supra note 9, at 272.
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to transmit property to one incapable of receiving, would name
a legatee or institute an heir with the request, or prayer, that
the bequset be delivered to the incapable. This request was not
obligatory, but rested on trust, hence the name.
When the practice of ignoring these requests became quite
prevalent, Augustus made them obligatory, and in time a praetor
was appointed to administer them. At first, these fideicommissa
differed from legata, and considerable difficulty arose because
the heir who turned over the bequest to the second beneficiary
remained bound as an heir, and frequently would be required
to turn over the entire inheritance. Often he would not accept,
and thus deprive the substituted heir of the bequest. Two de-
crees were adopted to obviate these difficulties:
The Senatus Consultum Trebellianum A.D. 56, under Nero,
regulated the relationship and responsibilities between the heres
and fideicommissarius; and the Senatus Consultum Pegasianum,
about A.D. 73, under Vespasian, provided that the "donee, in-
stituted heir or legatee" could retain one-fourth of the whole
of the inheritance he was required to deliver to a "third person."
This is the counterpart of the portion retained by the heir from
excessive legacies impinging on his inheritance under the Lex
Falcidia, 40 B.C.
Under Justinian, the distinction between legata and fidei-
commissa practically disappeared. The Trebellianic and Pegasian
decrees were merged, and the portion of the thing bequeathed
to be retained by the instituted heir when he made delivery to
the substituted heir was called thereafter the Trebellianic por-
tion.
By the time of Justinian's codificiation, the character of the
fideicommissum had drastically changed from the voluntary
and fiduciary nature it originally had before Augustus to such
a degree that by means of the fideicommissum it was possible
to pass property expressly or by necessary implication from
one successor to another successively, an indefinite number of
times.1 Justinian stopped this practice at the fourth successor
11. This development of the jidei commissum is often overlooked by writers
discussing it in comparison with common law trusts.
There seems to be no question but that the fidei commissum as it existed
at the time of Justinian was the source of its counterparts in French and Spanish
law.
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by his 159 Novel,12 just as France limited the substitution fidei-
commissaire to three degrees a thousand years later.1 3
There are now available English translations of Gaius' In-
stitutes and Justinian's Institutes. They give a succinct history
of fideicommissa.14 But in this area these translations are con-
fusing, because technical terms of the common law have been
used to translate technical terms of Roman Law, when they are
not equivalent. For example, Gaius' Institutes begins the dis-
cussion at Book II, Section 246, with this statement. "Nunc
transeamus ad fideicommissa," which is translated, "Let us now
pass on to trusts." Justinian's Institutes, Book II, Title XXIII,
begins with the same sentence, with the same translation.
Much of this difficulty has been obviated in the Louisiana
Civil Code by keeping intact or anglicizing the terms used in
the Code Napoleon from which the Louisiana Code is derived.
In the area we are discussing, the translation of the word "fidei-
commissa" (used in the Roman texts) as "trusts," "trust in-
heritances," "fiduciary bequests" and "entails," undoubtedly
is the cause of considerable difficulty and confusion.
Not all translators, however, use this method. For example,
Sandars says :15
"The word fideicommissum has been generally retained in
the translation, instead of trusts, because the fideicommissa in-
clude only trusts carrying out the wishes of deceased persons.
The word 'trusts' which is used much more widely in its applica-
tion, might lead to confusion."
To the same effect is the note of the translator of Brissaud's
History of French Private Law :16 "Trust has been rather badly
12. 159 NOVEL, ch. II (Ninth Collection, Title XLII), Scott's Trans., Vol. 17,
p. 190.
13. Ordinance of Orleans of 1560 limited substitutions fidei commissaire to
two degrees, not including the first institution. The Ordinance of Moulins of
1566 limited anterior substitutions to four degrees. 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS
ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 1968 (10th ed. 1950).
14. (A) INSTITUTES or GAIUS, Book II, §§ 246-289, Fideicommissa; 1
ZULUETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 139; (Commentary) Vol. 2, at 113; POSTE,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 271 (B) INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book II, Title
XXIII, p. 309, De Fidei-commissariis Hereditatibus, Title XXIV, p. 318, DE
SINGULIS REBUS PER FIDEICOMMISSUM RELICTIS; SANDARS, Op. cit. supra note
9, at 325; MOYLE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 94; MOYLE (Annotated) op. cit. supra
note 9, at 309.
15. SANDARS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 325.
16. 3 BRIsSAUD, HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW, CONTINENTAL LEGAL
HISTORY SERIES pp. 726-727 (Trans. Note 6.) (1912).
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translated by fideicommis. The converse is also true in this
translation for the word 'fideicommis' has been rendered 'trust'
for want of a better term."
One of the latest works on Roman law in English, An Intro-
duction to Roman Law (1962) by Professor J.K.B. Nicholas,
of Brasenose College, Oxford, retains the Latin names of "fidei-
commissum" and "substitution" and does not attempt to trans-
late them with English technical terms.
Finally, it may be appropriate to conclude this particular
discussion with the note of the translator of Voet's great com-
mentary on the Pandects. At the beginning of Book XXXVI,
Title 1, which in Latin is "Ad senatusconsultum Trebellianum,"
and in the translation "The Senatorial Decree Named After Tre-
bellius - Fideicommissa," the translator's note says:
"Because from a modern point of view the value of this
title lies in its treatment of fideicommissa, it has been given a
second supplementary title in the heading. The word fidei-
commissum, clumsy though it is, has been generally retained in
translation in order to avoid confusion with the English law of
trusts."
This translation of Voet was made by a distinguished judge
from South Africa, for use there, where Roman-Dutch law is in
force.17
Conclusion
If we retain the name and look to the substance of what the
term means, there cannot be the slightest doubt that in Roman
law substitutions meant only the vulgar and pupillary substitu-
tions and derivatives from them as they are described above;
and that fideicommissum in Roman law meant exactly the same
thing as the prohibited substitution described in article 1520
of the Louisiana Civil Code and article 896 of the Code Na-
poleon, and which in French law and legal literature is called
"fideicommis" or substitution "fideicommissaire," indiscrimi-
nately, or simply "substitution."
There is attached, as Annex 1, a bibliographical note that
17. The Selective Voet, being the Commentary on the Pandects [Paris Edition
of 1820] by Joannes Voet, [1647-1713] and the supplement to that work by
Johannes Van Der Linden (1756-1835) translated by Percival Gane formerly
judge of the Supreme Court at South Africa [Durban-1956], Vol. 5, p. 331.
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lists Roman and other law sources consulted in preparing this
precis. No quotations from Justinian's Great Digest or Pandects
have been given. His Institutes, like that of Gaius, from which
it is derived to a very considerable extent, was a condensation
for teaching law and for ready reference. The format of the
Digest cannot serve the needs of concise statement in semantical
dialectic. References, however, are given to Scott's translation
and to the monumental works of Pothier and Domat who or-
ganized and gave facility of application to the civil law in
France in the period preceding the Code Napoleon.
France - Pre-R evolutionary Law (Ancien Droit)i8
Before the Revolution, France had a great many local juris-
dictions originating in the practice of the personality of laws,
according to which the law applicable to an individual was that
of his national origin. Accordingly, the South of France, pre-
dominately Roman, had Roman law, codified out of pre-Justinian
sources when the Western Roman Empire fell to the Visigoths
and Burgundians in 476. (It is called "Pays De Droit Ecrit"
or Region of the Written Law.) At a somewhat later date
Northern France was occupied by the Franks, whose law was
composed of unwritten Customs of Germanic origin. (It is called
"Pays Coutumieres" or Regions or Localities of Customary
Law.)
With the rise of feudalism, laws ceased to be personal and
individual, and became territorial in application. In the North,
many local customs developed with considerable territorial
rigidity. These numerous territorial customs were codified in
the early sixteenth century and revised during the latter part
of that century.
The revival of Roman law based on Justinian's Great Codi-
fications which started at the University of Bologna, in the
twelfth century, soon spread to France and the Corpus Juris
Civilis became the basic law of the South of France, of Roman
tradition. Because of its organization, extent and intrinsic
18. For a concise account of French law during this period see 1 PLANIOL,
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (12th ed. 1939), LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE TRANSLATION, Vol. I, ch. II, p. 23 (1959). An extensive account of
the development of the fidei commissum in Rome and its adoption in France is
given in SouM, LA TRANSMISSION DE LA SUCCESSION TESTAMENTAIRE nos. 22-26,
27, 30-37 (1957).
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merit, this Roman law was frequently applied in the Customary
region of the North, whenever the Customs were silent.
The several substitutions of the Roman law were generally
admitted in that part of France deriving its law from Rome
(Pays De Droit Ecrit- Region of Written Law).19 Only two
substitutions were admitted in the part having the Germanic
customs (Pays Coutumieres - Customary Regions) ; viz., the
vulgar, or direct substitution, and the substitution fideicommis-
saire, or oblique substitution. 2 )
The vulgar substitution was permitted everywhere. 21 The
substitution fideicommissaire was valid in the Region of the
Written Law, and permitted in most of the Customary Regions
or Localities, but several of them prohibited substitutions fidei-
commissaires absolutely or when it was made by act of last
will.22
The fideicommissum of the Roman law as it was established
by Justinian was adopted in France under the designation of
"substitution fideicommissaire," and is frequently referred to
in all French commentaries and civil law literature as "substitu-
tion" without any other qualification.2 3
But the substitutions fideicommissaires of the French law
"have played an important role in the past; they are meant
when one uses the simple term 'fideicommissa.'-"24 "It bears the
name of fideicommissaire because it found its first origin in
the Roman fideicommissum. When the word 'substitution' is
used without any qualification, that is always meant. ' 25
Domat, whose Les Lois Civiles Dans Leur Ordre Naturel
19. 34 CARPENTIER - Du SAINT, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT FRANCAIS, Verbo
Substitutions, no. 12, at 1105 (1904).
20. 7 POTHIER, OEUVRES - Traite des Substitutions 547 (ed. Dupin 1835)
"We have, in the region (localities) of the customs, only two kinds of substitu-
tions: The vulgar, or direct substitution, and the substitution fideicommissaire."
21. CARPENTIER-Du SAINT, op. cit supra note 19, Verbo Substitutions, no.
13, at 1105.
22. 11 AUBRY & RAU, CouRs DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 159, § 692 (6th ed.
1956); 16 MERLIN, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE - Verbo Fideicommissaire,
Section I, § 12 (5th ed. 1827).
23. 16 MERLIN, op. cit. supra note 22, at 507. 5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIs 392, n. 3 (2d ed. 1957) say that the Romans
used the term "fidei-commissum" (French: fidei-commis) and did not use the
term "substitution" in connection with fidei-commissum, nor did they classify it
as a substitution, reserving that term for the direct substitutions, viz., vulgar,
pupillary, exemplary.
24. 3 PLANIOL, op. cit supra note 18, at no. 3266.
25. 4 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITE DR DROIT CIVIL no. 3855 (1959).
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has enriched the legal literature of the world, was an outstand-
ing figure in this early period of French law. His writings and
those of Pothier are a prime source of information concerning
the law of that period.
In his great work, which was published first in 1694, he had
this to say in the preamble to Book V, under the rubric "Des
Substitutions Et Des Fideicommis" :26
"This word substitution in general has two significations
(meanings) which must be distinguished: One comprehends
the dispositions of testators, who, having instituted an heir
and fearing that he might be incapable or not desirous of
accepting the appointment, name another on his default to
be heir; the other comprehends the dispositions of testators
who desire to pass their properties from one successor to
another, so that the first one called having succeeded, trans-
mits these things after his death to a second; and that if
several are called, the property will pass from one to the
other successively from degree to degree.
"The first of these two sorts of substitutions is that which
is called vulgar, from the name that it had in Roman law,
because it was frequently used to prevent the situation where
it might happen that the first instituted heir might not
succeed, as if he should die before the testator; as if he
should renounce the inheritance; as if he should be incapable
of succeeding; as if he should have made himself unworthy
to succeed.
"... The other kind of substitution which made the in-
heritance pass from one successor to another, is that which
is properly called fideicommissum in Roman law, because
it was used frequently through dispositions in terms of en-
treaty or prayer that the testator made to his heir to deliver
either the inheritance, or some particular thing to the person
he named, relying on the fidelity of his heir for the execution
of his will. Fideicommissa in the beginning depended on the
good faith of the heirs [a 1. Inst. De Fideicomm. Hered. (Lib.
II - Tit. XXIII)], but afterwards they had the same force
and effect as other dispositions of testators [D. ¢ Inst. De
26. 7 DomAT, OEUVRES DE J. DOMAT 2-4 (ed. M. Carre, 1824); for an Eng-
lish translation see DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER (translated
by William Strahan, edited from Second London Edition by Luther S. Cushing,
1850).
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Fideicomm. Hered.] ; and they were used very frequently as
well as vulgar substitutions. But the name substitution in
Roman Law is properly applied to vulgar substitutions, and
substitutions fideicommissaire are hardly known there ex-
cept under the name of fideicommissum; because a substitu-
tion passing property from one successor to another could
be made only in terms of entreaty, or other similar terms,
as described in Section 4 of Testaments, and not in direct
and imperative terms [L7. De Vulg. Pupill. Subst. Ult. De
Pupill. Subst.] discussed in the same place and not necessary
to be repeated here ....
"But in our usage, the testator may express himself
either in direct and imperative terms, or in terms of fidei-
commissum; and in whatever manner may be conceived the
substitution which causes property to pass from one suc-
cessor to another, it has its effect if the intention of the
testator is clearly expressed; and this kind of substitutions
are called either substitutions fideicommissaire because of
their origin in Roman law through use of the fideicom-
missum, or gradual substitutions because they cause the
property to pass to the substitutes one after the other through
several degrees; and they are also called purely and simply
substitutions; so much so, in our common usage, that the
simple word substitution is extended to those of this nature,
because they are more frequently used than either the vulgar
or the pupillary substitution, and it makes no difference
whether they be conceived in terms of fideicommissum, or
in direct and imperative terms, they have quite the same
effect, as we have said before."
These substitutions fideicommissaire were not introduced in
France until the twelfth century - and then as a result of the
Renaissance of the Roman law. Their use was greatly expanded
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.2 7 They became for the
27. The extent to which use of these substitutions fidei-commissaire expandee.
in France during this period may be appreciated from the elaborate discussions
given them by both Domat and Pothier, reflected in the Tables of Contents ox
their works.
(a) 7 DOMAT, op. cit. supra note 26, Vol. 7, reads:
Book V, Of Substitutions and Fideicommissa, p. 1.
Title I, Of The Vulgar Substitution, p. 6.
Title II, Of The Pupillary Substitution, p. 16.
Title III, Of Direct and Fideicommissary Substitutions, p. 50.
Title IV, Of The Trebellianic Decree, p. 121.
Corresponding references to the Strahan translation, op. cit. supra note 26,
are:
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nobility the means of conserving the integrity of their fortunes,
generation after generation, and of assuring its transmission
to the eldest son who bore the title of the family and was repre-
sentative of the name. And the substitution, or fideicommissum,
transferring the patrimony through an indefinite number of
generations protected it from the prodigality of the heirs them-
selves.
At a time when landed property constituted the chief source
of wealth, and noble families were being destituted slowly but
surely through the effects of the partition of estates and the
prodigality of heirs, the institution of fideicommissa, or sub-
stitutions fideicommissaire, became the means of preserving a
rich and numerous nobility around the throne. An aristocracy,
it has been said, can only maintain itself by the use of substitu-
tions.
But this system, which was completely free in its exercise,
up to the middle of the sixteenth century, inevitably led to grave
consequences to cope with which restrictive legislation was en-
acted before the Revolution.
This included:
(a) Edict of 3 May 1553, requiring publicity and registra-
tion for substitution fideicommissaire.
(b) Ordinance of Orleans of 1560 limiting these substitu-
tions to two degrees, not including the first institution.
(c) Ordinance of Moulins of 1566, limiting anterior substitu-
tions to four degrees.
(d) Ordinance of August 1747, by D'Aguesseau, established
a uniform law regulating substitutions for all of France.
It is entitled "Des Substitutions." 28
Book V, p. 617.
Title I, p. 621.
Title II, p. 628.
Title III, p. 647.
Title IV, p. 676.
(b) POTHIER, PANDECTS DE JUSTINIAN (Breard - Neville Translation, re-
vised and corrected by Moreau de Montalin 1821).
Vol. 10, Substitutions Properly Speaking, p. 519; Vols. 11 and 12, Legacies
and Ji'ideicommissa; Vol. 14, Of The Trebellianic Decree, p. 187.
(c) 7 POTnIM, op. cit. supra note 20, Traite Des Substitutions, at 547-647.
28. The text of this ordinance is given in full in 22 ISAMBERT, DECIUSY AND
TAILLANDIER, RECUEIL GENERAL DES ANCIENNES LoiS FRANCAIS DEPUIs L'AN
420 JuSQUA LA REVOLUTION DE 1789 (1737-1774), no. 629, at 193 (1830). Some
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The preamble to this Ordinance29 of August 1747 shows the
restrictions that had been placed on the free and unlimited exer-
cise of the substitution fideicommissaire and the motives for the
restrictions. It is interesting to compare this Ordinance and
those of 1560 and 1566, limiting the degrees for substitutions,
with Justinian's 159 Novel, doing exactly the same thing. And
the Ordinance of 1747 conclusively shows the identity of this
substitution with the Roman fideicommissum, and with the sub-
stitution prohibited by Code Napoleon article 896.80
France - Intermediate Period
(Revolutionary Period)
The fideicommissum, or substitution fideicommissaire, or as
frequently called substitution, was abolished during the Revolu-
tion, perhaps as much for political reasons as for sound and
logical dissatisfaction with its operation. 31
Planiol, in the Louisiana Law Institute's translation, says:
"The Revolution suppressed fiduciary substitutions (sub-
stitutions fideicommissaires) together with the feudal and
aristocratic system. This legislation is usually justified on
interesting letters written by Chancellor D'Aguesseau about this ordinance are
reproduced in Oeuvres de M. Le Chancelier D'Aguesseau (1776) Tome IX, Con-
tenant Les Lettres Sur Les Matiers Criminelles and Sur Les Matieres Civiles:
Letter CCCLXI 25 August 1730, p. 508
Letter CCCLXII, 6 September 1730, p. 508
Letter CCCLXIII, 15 March 1747, p. 509
Letter CCCLXIV, 24 May 1748, p. 512
Letter CCCLXV, 9 July 1748, p. 516
Letter CCCLXVI, 30 August 1748, p. 516
Letter CCCLXVII, 6 November 1748, p. 524
Letter CCCLXVIII, 16 July 1749, p. 524.
29. The preamble of the Ordinance of 1747 on substitutions in translation is
attached as Annex 2. An early commentary on this Ordinance was written by
Furgole and published in 1775.
30. The Ordinance of August 1747, should be compared with the Exposes Des
Motifs made in the French legislative bodies about the abolition of substitutions,
when the Code Napoleon was adopted.
These motifs are discussed in all of the basic French Treatises such as 3
PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 18, no. 3269; 5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra
note 23, no. 285; 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, op. cit. supra note 13; 11 BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQuE ET PRATIQuE DE DROIT CIVIL (3d ed. 1905) ;
11 AUBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22; 16 MERLIN, op. cit. supra note 22;
34 CARPENTIER-Du SAINT, op. cit. supra note 19; 4 RIPERT & BOULANGER, op.
cit. supra note 25, no. 3852.
31. The revolutionary legislation abolishing substitutions was adopted Novem-
ber 14, 1792. This action by the Revolution is discussed in: 3 PLANIOL op. Cit.
supra note 18, no. 3272; 4 RIPERT & BOULANGER, op. cit. supra note 25, no. 3272;
5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra note 23, no. 394; 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, op.
cit. supra note 13, no. 1969; 34 CARPENTIER-DU SAINT, op. cit. supra note 19,
Verbo Substitution, no. 39s; SouM, op. cit. supra note 18, at 67.
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the ground that the Revolution sought to facilitate mobility
of property, and release land from the limitations which kept
it out of commerce. That may have been part of the con-
sideration at the time, but the real motives were political,
as contemporary documents show.
32
France- Modern Period Adoption
Of Code Napoleon
The record of the proceedings in the three legislative
branches under the consulate which resulted in the adoption of
the Code Napoleon shows that the abolition of substitutions
effected during the Revolution was maintained for some of the
reasons alluded to in the preamble to the Ordinance of 1747
regulating them. That action is reflected in article 896, quoted
earlier in this discussion and which, in effect, defines the sub-
stitution which caused their abolition during the Revolution.
The objections to substitutions, of decisive effect in causing
their restriction under pre-Revolutionary law, and their aboli-
tion during the Revolution, confirmed and restated in article
896 of the Code Napoleon were:
(1) They established an order of succession other than that
provided by law;
(2) They retired large amounts of property from commerce
and circulation;
(3) They tended to the deterioration of property by with-
holding from possessors obligated to deliver to a substitute the
benefits of ownership, and consequently any incentive to make
repairs;
(4) They might mislead creditors of the possessor into
thinking they had security in the property possessed by him,
when actually that property was burdened with a substitution;
(5) They would be a constant source of discord and discon-
tent in the family resulting in frequent litigation. 33
32. 3 PLANIOL, Op. cit. supra note 18, Part 2, no. 3272. The author's notes
for this quotation are "(4) Act. November 14, 1792, absolutely prohibiting sub-
stitutions in the future, and making void all that have been already made but not
yet executed. An execution of a substitution is the death of the fiduciary and
the existence of cestuis capable to receive the property in question."
"(5) Letter of Bonaparte, cited in DuCasse 'Memoires Et Correspondence'
...Du Roi Joseph (3rd Ed.) Vol. II, pp. 299-300 (1856)"
33. 3 MARCADE, EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE CODE CIVIL,
art. 896 C.N., no. 457, p. 370 (6th ed. 1866).
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Bigot-Preameneu, one of the four jurists commissioned to
prepare the projet of the Code Napoleon, was the orator who
presented to the Corps Legislatif the motives of the government
for that part of the projet relating to donations and testaments.
Speaking to the Conseil d'Etat at the Seance of 14 Pluvoise (3
February 1803), held at the Tuilieries under the presidency of
the First Consul, he said:
"In order that his opinion be well understood there are,
in this matter, some general notions which should be remem-
bered.
"Substitution is defined by the Roman jurisconsults
'Secundi vel deinceps haeredis institutio.'
"This definition is applied to two very different kinds of
substitutions.
"One is the disposition by which the testator, fearing
that the heir whom he has instituted may not or will not
accept, names another who, in this default, will be heir.
"This kind of substitution was called vulgar in Roman
law, because its usage was very frequent. Each testator had
the intention of foreseeing that it might happen that the heir
first instituted would not succeed either by his predecease
or by his renunciation of the succession, or by his incapacity
to receive the succession or because he was unworthy.
"The other kind of substitution is that by which the
things of a succession pass to another in such a manner that
the one first instituted possesses only under the charge of
delivering to him or them who are appointed after him.
"This is what is called a fideicommis because at first a
formula of prayer (or entreaty) was addressed to him who
was charged to deliver and on whose good faith the testator
relied; but later the restitution was made obligatory; and
in place of a simple fideicommis, testators openly made sub-
stitutions of one heir to another.
"These substitutions were called gradual because they
made the things pass to the substitutes, one after another,
following the order, that is to say in the language of the law,
according to the degree in which they have been called.
"The right to substitute several successors, the ones after
1964]
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the others was not limited to heirs; it was applicable to
simple legacies or to dispositions inter vivos.
"Its usage was thus very frequent. Testators found by
this means an unlimited right of disposition; they saw in it
a means of preserving their properties in their families;
they also sheltered their descendents or other relatives from
the bad conduct of those whom nature called to possess their
properties. '3
4
It is quite interesting to read the record of the legislative
procedure kept during the period when the Code Napoleon was
adopted. A descriptive index to that record is given in the cited
source.
From that record it is quite clear that the substitution meant
to be abolished was that described in the second paragraph of
article 896, namely, "every disposition by which the donee, the
instituted heir or the legatee is charged to preserve and deliver
to a third person will be null, etc."
M. Jaubert, in making his report to the Tribunate said this:
"Nevertheless it is necessary to understand what this law pro-
hibits. It is nothing else than that which was known in ancient
law under the name of fideicommissum. 35
One of the most respected modern commentaries - Aubry
and Rau - confirms this statement by saying, "Hereafter, we
will employ the term substitution in the restricted acceptation
which our ancient authors and the redactors of the Civil Code
attibute to it, to designate substitution fideicommissaire."3
Baron Grenier was one of the earliest writers who discussed
donations and testaments, the first edition of his work on that
subject having been published only three years after the adop-
tion of the Code Napoleon and one year before the promulgation
of the Louisiana Code of 1808. Writing under a sectional rubric
"of substitutions, fideicommissa and of the right to elect in the
principles of Roman law and according to French legislation"
he said, in pertinent part:
"Roman legislation was prodigiously enlarged by the in-
troduction of substitutions.
34. 11 LOCRE, LA LEGISLATION CIVILE COMMERCIAL ET CRIMINELLE DE LA
FRANCE Book III, Title II, Of Donations and Testaments, pp. 109-11 (1827).
35. 11 LOCRE, op. Cit. 8upra note 34, at 437.
36. 11 AuBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, at 161.
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"There were several kinds -They may be reduced to
three: The direct or vulgar substitution, the pupillary sub-
stitution and the substitution fideicommissaire . . . (Here
follows descriptions of vulgar and pupillary substitutions
and others derivative therefrom) . . .But the most impor-
tant substitution which, like the others, passed into French
legislation, and which has given rise to so many law suits
and caused so many volumes, is that by which the testator
charged his heir or a legatee, to deliver the succession or
legacy to another; that one was charged to deliver to a third;
this last to a fourth, etc. The objects should be delivered at
at determined time, or after the death of each of the sub-
stitutes (Appel6s).
"This substitution derived its principles from fidei-
commissum [Roman].... It may be said that it is principally
in French legislation that this species of disposition has
received the name of substitution, with the qualification
fideicommissaire." 37
It is interesting to note that Baron Grenier makes the same
tautological use of "substitutions and fideicommissa" in his
section heading that the redactors of the Louisiana Code of
1808 used in writing the prohibition against substitutions, viz.:
"substitutions and fideicommissa are and remain abolished. ' 3
Conclusion
This record establishes beyond doubt or question that the
substitution prohibited by article 896 of the Code Napoleon, as
it is defined in that article, is the fideicommissum of the Roman
law of Justinian. It came to France with the revival of Roman
law in the twelfth century, and was unified for the many in-
dependent jurisdictions of France by the Ordinance of 1747.
The evidence of those who developed its usage in France by their
writings, and the testimony of those who abolished it in the
Code Napoleon are unanimous and decisive on this point.
SPANISH LAW
Roman law was introduced into Spain and Southern France
by the Visigoths, for their Roman subjects, by means of the
37. 1 GRENIER, TRAITE DES DONATIONS, DES TESTAMENTS p. 85 (4th ed.
1826).
38. Id. § IV, at 85.
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Breviary of Alaric, or Lex Romana Visigothorum, in A.D. 506,
as explained earlier in this study. Earlier the Code of Euric, or
Codex De Tolsa (A.D. 466-484) had been prepared in order to
codify Germanic customary law. These two sources of law
coalesced to form the basis for the earlier Spanish codifications
[Antiqua (Lex Visigothom) A.D. 586-601; later to become the
Forum Judicum or Fuero Juzgo] and contributed much to later
codifications.
But at the time of redaction of the greatest of all Spanish
Codes, Las Siete Partidas (A.D. 1265), the revival of Roman
law based on Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis had taken place in
Bologna, and the redactors had the benefit not only of that great
work but also of the commentaries of the Italian jurisconsults
who brought about this renaissance. Consequently, several Parti-
das, viz., III, V & VI Partidas, derive directly from the Corpus
Juris. The Siete Partidas was not promulgated and its status
fixed until 1348, by the Ordenamiento of Alcala, and it was suc-
ceeded by other codifications, the Nueva Recopilacion, 1567; the
Recopilacion De Las Indias, 1680 (for Spanish-American colo-
nies) ; the Novisima Recopilacion, 1805; and other less compre-
hensive codifications or collections of laws.
The Spanish did not repeal earlier codes when a new code
was enacted, and the Siete Partidas remained as the most impor-
tant Spanish legal institution when Louisiana was under Spanish
dominion. In fact, soon after Spanish law was revived in Lou-
isiana by the Supreme Court in Cottin v. Cottin,3 9 in 1817, the
legislature authorized the translation of the Siete Partidas as
the most comprehensive and best of the Spanish codifications.
The Sixth Partida treats of Testaments and Inheritance, and
Title V thereof is concerned with substitutions. Law I defines
the word "substitution" and states how many kinds of substitu-
tions there are. In translation it reads:
"The word substitutus in Latin, means, in Castilian, an-
other heir appointed by the maker of a will to the second
place after the first one. This would be the case when he
says; 'I appoint so-and-so my heir, and, if he is unwilling, or
cannot accept, let so-and-so take his place.' A substitution of
this kind is called in Latin vulgaris, which means an appoint-
ment which anyone of the people can make of whomsoever
39. 5 Mart.(O.S.) 93, 94 (La. 1817).
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he wishes. There is another substitution called, in Latin,
pupillaris, which means an appointment made only of a boy
who is under fourteen years of age, or of a girl who is under
twelve. There is another kind of substitution, called in Latin,
exemplaris, which means another appointment of an heir,
made like that to which a minor is appointed. Fathers and
grandfathers have the power to do this, when those who are
descended from them are insane or have lost their minds, by
appointing others their heirs, if they should die while de-
mented. There is another kind, called in Latin, compendiosus,
which means an appointment made in a few words. There is
still another substitution called, in Latin, breviloquens seu
reciprocus, which means a substitution made briefly in con-
cise terms in which four substitutions are included, two of
which are, vulgares and two pupillares. There is still another
kind of substitution called, in Latin, fideicommissarius. And
of each of these different kinds of substitutions we shall
speak fully hereafter. ' '40
Subsequent laws of Title V then define and give the rules
concerning the several kinds of substitutions, viz., vulgar or or-
dinary substitutions (Laws II-IV) ; pupillary substitutions
(Laws V-X) ; exemplary substitutions (Law XI) ; substitutions
compendiosa (Law XII) ; substitutions breviloqua (Law XIII);
and finally fideicommissaria, in Law XIV, which in translation
reads :
"Law XIV. Concerning the substitution called, in Latin,
fideicommissaria.
"Fideicommissaria substitutio, in Latin means, in Cas-
tilian, the appointment of an heir which is made with the
belief of anyone that he will deliver to another party the in-
heritance which he leaves in his hands, as if the maker of
the will should say: 'I appoint so-and-so my heir, and I re-
quest, ask or direct that he hold this my estate which I leave
to him, for such-and-such a time, and that afterward he give
and deliver it to So-and-So.' An appointment like this can be
made by any one of the people, provided he is not forbidden
to do so by any of the laws of this our book. We decree, how-
ever, that he who is requested and appointed in this way,
must give and deliver the estate to the other party just as the
testator directed, deducting the fourth part of the same
40. LAS SIETPE PARTIDAS 1210 (Trans. S. P. Scott 1931).
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which he is entitled to keep. This fourth part is called tre-
bellianica. If the party appointed in this way as heir should
not be willing to accept the property or, after he has accept-
ed it, should refuse to deliver it to the other, the judge of
the district can compel him to do so."'4 1
When O'Reilly, Spanish Governor of Colonial Louisiana,
abrogated French law in Louisiana and substituted Spanish law,
this undoubtedly was included in the Spanish law which was
put in force in Louisiana and it so remained and was in force
at the time of the French cession to the United States in 1803,
the French Commissioner Laussat having done nothing to re-
store French law to Louisiana, in the very short interregnum
between the transfer from Spain to France and the French ces-
sion to the United States.
However, the citizens of Louisiana, under the new regime,
very early rejected attempts to establish the common law. Thpy
did not want to be regulated, either by laws which required re-
currence to a "multiplicity of books, which being for the most
part written in foreign languages, offer in their interpretation
inexhaustible sources of litigation." Moreau Lislet and Brown,
code commissioners, accordingly chose the Code Napoleon, only
lately adopted in France, as the model for their code which be-
came effective in 1808.
Spanish law was dormant thereafter until its virtual revival
by the decision in Cottin v. Cottin, in 1817, which led to the
translation of the Siete Partidas in 1820, as being the best ex-
emplar of the Spanish law. This, too, was short lived, because
Moreau, Derbigny, and Livingston were appointed two years
later to prepare the projet for a new civil code. Their work was
adopted and became effective in 1825. It is essential, however,
to know something of the origin and history of the legal institu-
tions of substitution and fideicommissa in Spanish law to under-
stand fully the use of those terms in the Louisiana Civil Code.
There can be no doubt about the Roman law origin of these
institutions in Spanish law. The very language of those portions
of the Partidas which are quoted above indicate as much and
scholars confirm the indication.42
41. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 1216.
42. Asso Y DJEL RIO, IGNACIO JORDAN DE AND MIIGUEL DE MANUEL Y
RODRIGUEZ INSTITUTES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN Book I, Title V, p. 132
(1st ed. 1771), (6th ed. Madrid 1805), (Trans. Johnson 1825). (Frequently
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It is interesting to note that the principal substitutions with
which we are concerned here, namely, the vulgar, pupillary, and
exemplary substitutions and substitutions fideicommissa, have
been adopted in the Modern Spanish Civil Code and the codes of
some of the countries deriving their laws from Spain.
Thus, the Spanish Civil Code, in Book III, Chapter II "Inheri-
tance," Section III "Substitutions," contains this article:
"Article 781. Substitution in trust (fideicomisarias), by
virtue of which the heir is charged with keeping and trans-
mitting to a third party the whole or a part of the inheri-
tance, shall be valid, and shall be effective, provided they do
not go beyond the second degree or when made in favor of
persons living at the time of the death of the testator."
The translator says that the sources of this article are Toro,
law 31; Part. 6. tit. 5; Inst. Part. 6, tit. 5, laws 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 10, 11, 13, 14; id. 6, tit. 11, law 8; Law of Oct. 11, 1820, arts.
1, 4, 5, 14; and indicates that Chile, Colombia, and Mexico have
similar legislation.4
3
Manresa's Commentary on the Spanish Civil Code in discus-
sing this section of the Code gives a succinct history of substi-
tutions, including fideicommissa, in Spanish law, and is cumu-
lative evidence of the correctness of their Roman origin and
their identity through inheritance and motif with their counter-
parts in French law. A translation of an abridgement of Man-
resa's commentary is given in Annex 3, attached hereto.
Conclusion
This evidence clearly establishes that Spain, like France,
adopted its law concerning substitutions from the Roman law of
Justinian, and that this law included fideicommissa, called in
Spanish, "Las substituciones fideicomisarias," exactly as the
French called them "substitutions fideicommissaire." The con-
clusion is inevitable that the use of the term "fideicommissum"
meant in the former law of Spain exactly the kind of substitu-
tion defined in article 781 of the Spanish Civil Code; in article
896 of the Code Napoleon; and in article 40, page 216 of the
cited as Asso and Manuel's Institutes); SCHMIDT, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND
MEXICO, HISTORICAL OUTLINE (1831); WALTON, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND
SPANISH AMERICA 273 (1900).
43. WALTON, op. cit. 8upra note 42, Book III, ch. II, § III, art. 781.
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Louisiana Civil Code of 1808; article 1507 of the Code of 1825
and article 1520 of the Code of 1870.
Louisiana - The Civil Code
In 1806, James Brown and Moreau Lislet were appointed by
the legislature of the Territory of Orleans to compile and pre-
pare a civil code for the use of the Territory, and to make the
civil law by which the Territory was governed the groundwork
of the Code.
In 1808 they reported their work under the title, "A Digest
of the Civil Laws Now In Force In The Territory Of Orleans,
With Alterations And Amendments Adopted To Its Present Sys-
tem of Government." It was adopted by an act approved March
31, 1808, the preamble to which reads:
"Whereas, in the confused state in which the civil laws
of this Territory were plunged by the effect of the changes
which happened to its government, it has become indispens-
able to make known the laws which have been preserved
after the abrogation of those which were contrary to the
Constitution of the United States or irreconcilable with its
principles, and to collect them in a single work, which might
serve as a guide for the decision of the courts and juries,
without recurring to a multiplicity of books which, being for
the most part written in foreign languages, offer in their
interpretation inexhaustible sources of litigation. '44
The laws of Spain were in effect at the time of the cession
of Louisiana to the United States, but they were contained in a
multiplicity of codes and enactments, with no fixed inter-code
priorities. On the other hand, the Code Napoleon had just been
adopted in increments in France, followed in March 1804 by its
adoption as a unit. Now for the first time the world had a sys-
tematic, logical, modern restatement of the civil law, derived
from Rome and the Customs.
It was natural, therefore, for Moreau Lislet and Brown to
turn to the Code Napoleon for the model and guide for the civil
code they were directed to make for Louisiana; particularly
since the population of Louisiana at that time was largely
French in origin, tradition, culture, and sympathy.
44. La. Acts 1808, pp. 120-128.
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That they did so is apparent from the structure, arrange-
ment, and language of the Code itself, which reproduces almost
literally at least seventy-five percent of the Articles of the Code
Napoleon.
But it must not be thought that the commissioners ignored
the Spanish law which played a large, but as yet undetermined,
part in the conception of the civil code. Moreau Lislet, partic-
ularly, must have been a Spanish law scholar, and familiar with
Roman law as well, for he was chosen, with Henry Carleton, to
translate the Siete Partidas, soon after the judicial revival of
Spanish law in 1817. In that translation, each title is preceded
by a list of the corresponding titles of the Roman and Spanish
laws, and of the Civil Code, and each law by a note referring to
the corresponding laws of the Recopilacion and of the Auto
Accordados, according to quotations in the edition of the Parti-
das of Gregorio Lopez. 45
This is clearly illustrated in article 40, Code of 1808, p. 216,
which prohibits substitutions. With a few slight differences,
the French text of the first two paragraphs are the same as ar-
ticle 896 of the Code Napoleon. The last paragraph, however,
has no counterpart in the Code Napoleon, but the Trebellianic
portion referred to in that article is authorized in Law 14, Title
V of the Sixth Partidas, relating to fideicommissaires. Surely
the redactors of 1808 had both the Code Napoleon and the Siete
Partidas before them when they prepared that Code.46
There are several differences in the French text of article
40, p. 216, of the Code of 1808, and the corresponding English
translation, 47 which are not critically important, but should be
noticed. They are:
1. In the first sentence, the French text says, "les substitu-
45. MOREAU & CARLETON, THE LAWS OF THE SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE
STILL IN FORCE IN LOUISIANA (1820).
46. For accounts of the early history of Louisiana law see: MARTIN, HISTORY
OF LOUISIANA 344 (1822) ; 17 SAUNDERS, LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (2d ed. 1920) ;
20 W. K. Dart, Louisiana Judicial System, 1 LOUISIANA DIGEST ANNOTATED
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1917) ; H. P. Dart, (1) The Influence of the Ancient Laws of
Spain on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 83 (1931) ; (2)
Sources of the Civil Code of Louisiana, 13 LA. BAR A.R. 21 (1911) ; Wigmore,
Louisiana: The Story of its Legal System, 1 So. L.Q. 1 (1916) ; Tucker, Source
Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280 (1931) ; 8 TUL. L. REV. 82 (1933);
reprinted 1 La. Legal Archives pp. XVII-XXXVI, and pp. Li - LX (1939);
WALLACH, LEGAL RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA (1958).
47. These texts appear in full at pp. 440-441 supra.
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tions et les fidei-commissa sont prohib6s." The English text says
they "are and remain prohibited" - this is inconsequential.
2. In the second paragraph, the French text reads ". . . est
chargg de conserver et de rendre d. un tiers ... ." The English
translation reads, ".... is charged to preserve for or to return a
thing . . . ." Here the addition of "a thing" is inconsequential,
and the translation of "et," (and) by "or" is obviously an error
to which no disjunctive effect should be given. The translation
of "rendre" as "return" is inaccurate.48
3. In the third paragraph, the French text reads, "la quatre
trgbellanique" is translated as "the Trebellianic portion," but
that also is inconsequential.
In the same paragraph, referring to the Trebellianic portion,
the French text reads, "... lorsqu'il 6tait chargg d'un fidei-com-
mis." The English translation reads, "... when he was charged
with a fideicommissa or fiduciary bequest." The addition of "fi-
duciary bequest" could not legally add something not implicit in
the term "fidei-commis" in the French text.
Moreau Lislet himself said: "We have nothing to do with
the imperfections of the translation of the Code - the French
text, in which it is known that work was drawn up, leaves no
doubt."4 9 And the Supreme Court has said that "the definition
relied on from the English side of the Articles of the Code,
proves nothing but the ignorance of the person who translated
it from the French."5 0
In Beaulieu v. Ternoir, 5 Ann. 476, 480 (1850), the Supreme
Court said: "Article 1507 of the Code which defines substitu-
tions was transcribed without change from the Code of 1808,
and the French text expresses the intention of the Legislature.
The English text, taken literally is without meaning."
The French text controls in such cases and if the addition of
the words "or fiduciary bequest" are to be given any meaning
48. See note 2 8upra. "Deliver" or "transmit," or even "render" are to be
preferred semantically to "return," for the first beneficiary holds the thing as
owner from the testator, and he is obligated, not to "return" it to the substituted
beneficiary who never had it, but to "deliver" or "transmit" it to him, who there-
by comes into its possession for the first time. Etymologically it would seem to
be better to translate the French "rendre" by the English "render," than by
"return."
49. Moreau's argument in rebuttal in Dufour v. Camfranc, 11 Mart. (O.S.)
675, 701 (1822).
50. Egerton v. Third Municipality of New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435-37 (1846).
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of connotation different from and not implicit in the French
term "fidei-commis," under the doctrine of the Supreme Court,
they must be reputed not written.5 1
There is, of course, a compelling reason why "or fiduciary
bequest" can only be considered as synonymous and identical
with "fideicommis" (French), "fideicommissum," (Latin), as
used in this context, and that is this: the Trebellianic portion
was only authorized in case of a fideicommissum, and no other
place. As above explained, this is readily apparent from Law
XIV, Title V, Partida VI.
There are some trivial differences between the French text
of article 40, Page 216, Code of 1808, and the text of article 896,
Code Napoleon, viz., the tense in which written, and the two ref-
erences to the "l'h6retier" are qualified only once as "instituted"
in the Louisiana Code, while in the French Code both references
are so qualified, which need no further comment.
The difference between the Louisiana Code and the French
Code, however, which has caused so much difficulty, is the addi-
tion of the term "fideicommissa" to the first sentence of the ar-
ticle, making the Louisiana Code read, "les substitutions et les
fidei-commis sont prohibees," while the French Code says, "les
substitutions sont prohibgs."
There has been some unjustified speculation that by the inter-
polation of "fideicommis" in the French text which they copied,
the redactors intended to prohibit trusts of the English common
law.
It would seem to be completely unjustifiable to imagine that
a scholar with the breadth of learning in the Civil Law of
Moreau Lislet would have used a technical term of the Roman
civil law, with the precise connotation of fideicommissum, to
prohibit the use of an alien legal concept. If it was desired to
prohibit the use of common law trusts, is it not reasonable to
suppose that the redactors would have said: "Substitutions and
trusts are prohibited"? On the other hand, is it not probable
that Moreau Lislet and Brown, knowing substitutions as defined
in the Code Napoleon, had been prohibited in France since 1792,
and realizing that Spanish law permitted the very same kind of
51. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. City of New
Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928) ; Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722,
135 So. 38 (1931).
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substitution under the title of "fideicommissaria," interpolated
"fideicommis" in the French text which they copied from the
Code Napoleon out of an abundance of caution ?52
However, it must be said that a distinguished panel of
French jurists, in reporting on the validity of the McDonough
will, gave some credence to the unsupported speculation to the
contrary. They said:
"In our opinion, the word fidei-commissa was added to
Article 896 of the French Civil Code, in Article 1507 (Code
of 1825, same as Art. 40, p. 216, Code of 1808) of the Louisi-
ana Code on account of the English origin of the other states
of the Union, and in order to prohibit at once both substitu-
tions under old French law, and the Trust of English law.
Now in no part of his will has McDonough appointed any
trustee. The cities have the legal estate donated to them...
The dispositions are, therefore, nothing more than legacies
made to the cities, with the charge of investing them in a
specific way and for municipal purposes. In all of this there
is neither substitution nor fideicommissum. ' '.5
And in this statement there is nothing to support the opinion
that "fideicommissa" meant English common law trusts.
In opposition to that view, it is not inappropriate or impolite
to cite a few quotations from Coin-Delisle, one of the signers of
that report. In his Commentaire du Titres Des Donations Et Des
Testaments,54 he said:
"13. The inventive spirit of the jurisconsults did not stop
there .... [re codicils] They introduced in addition in the
legislation substitutions and fideicommissa: Two very dis-
52. Strong support for this view can be found in one of the early commen-
taries on the Code Napoleon, Les Pandectes Francaises by Riffe-Caubray and
Delaporte (1805), Volume 8 of which concerns Book III, Title II, "Of Donations
and Testaments." The sixth part under the rubric "Preliminary Notions." p. 2,
is entitled "De La Falcidie et des Fideicommis" p. 213. In Section II of Part VI,
with the heading, "Des Fideicommis," p. 219, there is a discussion of the historical
development of fidei-commissa substantially as it has been given here. Then fol-
lows immediately a discussion of the separate articles of the Code Napoleon
which constitutes the title. The very first observation made under article 896 is
this: "This disposition concerns only fideicommis; the vulgar substitution may be
used always, as may be seen in Article 898 hereafter." P. 241.
Moreau Lislet cites this work several times in the Projet of the Code of 1825.
The volume to which I have referred and from which I have translated belonged
to him, for on the inside cover it is signed "L. Moreau Lislet."
53. State v. Executors of McDonough, 8 La. Ann. 171, 231 (1854).
54. COIN-DELISLE, op. cit. supra note 8, Introduction, nos. 13 and 14, at 7,
no. 16, at 8, no. 26, at 12.
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tinct kinds of dispositions in Roman law, although the name
of substitutions had been affected specially in our French
law by a remarkable branch of the matter of fideicommissa.
"14. In Roman law three kinds of testamentary disposi-
tions received the name of substitution - the vulgar substi-
tution, the pupillary substitution and the exemplary substitu-
tion. They derived all of their origin from the unlimited
power to dispose by will, and from the absolute authority
over children which the law of the XII Tables gave to the
father of a family ....
"It was particularly when the name of substitution be-
came the language of the school common to fideicommissd
that the vulgar substitution took the name of direct substi-
tution, in opposition to the substitution fideicommissaire
which was called oblique. In the first, the things came di-
rectly from the testator; in the second they came to the fidei-
commissaire only through the one instituted (institu6) as
intermediary.
"16. Let us pass on to the fideicommissum, which the
jurisconsults at Rome had never called substitutions, and
which nevertheless have taken this name in French law,
when the one instituted (institu6) delivers the things only
at his death.
"26. The same spirit which introduced contractual insti-
tutions against the principles of the Roman law, borrowed
substitutions from it. The reader knows that we do not wish
to speak here of direct substitutions, but of fideicommissa
subordinated to the decease of the first one instituted (insti-
tu6) through whom the head of the family established as a
new order of succession. They are called substitutions fidei-
commissaire, or more simply substitutions, in such manner
that this word employed alone is extended always to those
which cause the inheritance (biens) to pass from one suc-
cessor to another."
Marcade, another French jurisconsult who signed the report
in the McDonough case, in speaking of article 896 of the Code
Napoleon said:
"Dispositions which this article prohibits under the name
of substitutions are not the same as those called substitutions
by the Romans.
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"The Romans were known to have three kinds of substi-
tutions, or secondary institutions (sub-institutio) : 1. The
vulgar substitution . .. ; 2. The pupillary substitution ... ;
3. Lastly, the quasi-pupillary or exemplary substitution ....
"Those are not the substitutions spoken of in our Article.
With us the vulgar substitution is permitted by the positive
declaration of Article 898. Pupillary and exemplary substi-
tutions are prohibited, but not by our Article 896. It is under
general principles of French law that one can never make a
will for another. A testator can bequeath his own estate only
(Article 895).
"Our Article concerns only those dispositions which in
Rome would be fideicommissa, and which in our former
(ancien) law were known as substitutions fideicommissaires.
We know, as a result, that the fideicommissum was the act
by which one person received a thing with the command to
deliver (rendre) it to another; and it is apparent from the
second paragraph of our Article that the dispositions in ques-
tion are precisely those which impose on a beneficiary the
charge to deliver it to a third person. ' '55
In the light of their own writings, the undocumented opinion
of these respected and eminent jurisconsults who made the re-
port in the McDonough will case, that the word "fideicommissa"
was used in the Louisiana Civil Code article 1507 (Article 40, p.
216, Code of 1808, article 1520, Code of 1870) to prohibit the
introduction of common law trusts, is entitled to little weight.
And the Supreme Court of the United States in Executors of
McDonough v. Murdoch,5 6 in which this same will of McDonough
was at issue, had before it this same report of the French juris-
consults. In the course of its opinion, the Court said:
"The fideicommissa of the Louisiana Code are estates of
a similar nature implying a limitation over from one to an-
other. They are the fideicommissa of the Spanish and French
laws, insofar as those estates are not tolerated by other ar-
ticles of the Code. We shall not attempt to define them from
an examination of the Code and the reports of the Supreme
Court of that state. It is not necessary for a decision of this
55. 3 MAcADE, op. cit. aupra note 33, art. 896 C.N., no. 455, at 368.
56. Executors of McDonough v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367 (U.S. 1853).
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case. We are unable to see anything in the Code to justify;
the supposition that the English system of trusts whether in
the limited system as applied in conveyancing, or in its broad
and comprehensive imports, as applied by the Courts of
Chancery, were within the purview of the authors of this
Code in framing this prohibition. The terms substitution and
fideicommissa are words foreign to the English law. They
are applied to no legal relation which exists in it, and de-
scribe nothing which forms a part of it. The technical words,
of 'charged to preserve and to render' in Article 1507, which
embrace so much to a continental lawyer, only provoke in-
quiries in the mind of one accustomed to the language of the
common law. The allusion to the 'trebellianic portion' is to a
right of which there has never been a counterpart in the
English system. The whole Article refers exclusively to
things of a continental origin." (Emphasis added.)
Dr. F. T. Gubler, who, with Dr. C. Reymond made reports,
after the most detailed comparative examinations of the Anglo-
Saxon "trust" and the continental "fiducia" to the Swiss Law
Society, is reported to have "complained rightly about the fre-
quent terminological confusion of the terms 'trust' and 'treu-
hand' and demanded that the English terms 'trust,' 'trustee,'
'settlor,' 'beneficiary,' and 'cestui qui trust' be accepted as
'unubersetzbare fremdworte,' i.e., as being untranslatable for-
eign words. And on page 270, Dr. Gubler, after an exhaustive
discussion of the main characteristics of an English "trust," ar-
rived at the conclusion that "all attempts to explain the trust in
terms of continental law must fail." 7
All of this array of authorities should completely dissipate
the confusion that has resulted from the unsupported speculation
that the use of the "fideicommissa" in article 1520 and its coun-
terparts in the Codes of 1808 and 1825 was for the purpose of
prohibiting the English common law trust.
Finally, an examination of the article itself will conclusively
demonstrate the complete lack of any basis or foundation for
that theory.
The fideicommissum of the Roman law, as finally developed
in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, was exactly as described in
57. Gubler, Trusts on the Continent of Europe, 4 INT. AND COmP. LAW Q. 550
(1955).
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the second paragraph of the article -i.e., a "disposition by
which the donee, heir or legatee is charged to preserve for and
deliver (the thing) to a third person." It is exactly the same as
the substitution (fideicommissaire) prohibited by the prototype
article of the French Code.58
And that is made certain by the third paragraph of article
1520 (article 1507 Code of 1825) which says:
"In consequence of this Article" (the Code of 1808 said "by
means of what is contained in this Article"), the Trebellianic
portion of the Civil Law, that is to say the portion of the prop-
erty of the testator which the instituted heir had a right to de-
tain, when he was charged with a fideicommissa or fiduciary be-
quest." (The French text stops with "fideicommis," as pointed
out above).
Now the Trebellianic portion was authorized only in the case
of a fideicommissum, the characteristics of which were exactly
as described in the second paragraph of the article, and exactly
as described in Law 14, Title V, Partid VI, which authorized
fideicomisarias, and the deduction of the Trebellianic portion in
such cases.
The second and third paragraphs of article 1520, and its
predecessor article, related and could only relate to fidiecom-
missa. The article (particularly in the French text) says as
much.
And it must be remembered that at the time article 40, p. 216
of the Code of 1808 was written, all the substitutions and the
fideicommissa of the Roman law were authorized in Title V, Par-
tida VI, of the Spanish Siete Partidas, which was then effective
in Louisiana (Territory of Orleans), while in France substitu-
tions fideicommissaire had been abolished since 1792.
So it was that Moreau Lislet and Brown made sure that these
substitutions and fideicomisarias of the Spanish law were abol-
ished in the Civil Code of Louisiana, and they are bound to have
58. Compare In re Courtin, 144 La. 971, 977, 81 So. 457 (1919), which
says:
"The second paragraph of the article of the Code (1520) itself, in effect gives
practically the same meaning to the term 'fidei commissum,' when it says:
'Every disposition by which the donee, the heir or legatee is charged to pre-
serve for or to return a thing to a third person is null, even with regard to the
donee.'"
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had these laws of the Partidas in mind when they wrote "substi-
tutions and fideicommissaire are prohibited."
When Moreau Lislet and Carleton translated the Partidas
(published 1820) they did not translate Title V of Partidas VI
at all, and contented themselves with saying: "Substitutions
have been abrogated by the civil code as well as fidei commissa,
C. Art. 4, p. 216." And by that omission all of this Spanish law
so important to a complete understanding of the import of our
Code was denied to nearly all of the profession in Louisiana, for
they did not understand Spanish. Scott's translation in 1931
was the first complete translation of the Partidas in English.
The Supreme Court has itself noted the lack of Spanish
authorities in connection by a case involving this article of the
Civil Code. It said; "The other point that the substitution had
failed . . . was merely stated as an additional ground and refer-
ence was made to some French authorities; as the will then
under consideration was made under the laws of Spain, we
would have consulted the Spanish commentators on the subject
in preference to the French, had any been at hand. It was not
believed that there could be much variance of opinion between
them on the subject of substitutions, which it is well known de-
scended into French and Spanish jurisprudence from the same
source, the Roman law."a
Conclusion
This evidence establishes, beyond a doubt, that:
1. The redactors of the Civil Code of 1808 drafted article 40,
page 216 (article 1507, Code of 1825; article 1520, Code of 1870)
with both the Code Napoleon and the Siete Partidas before them.
The third paragraph of the article was clearly inspired by Law
14, Title V, of Partida VI.
2. The fideicommissum of Justinian's codifications, the sub-
stitution fideicommisarias of the Spanish law, the fideicommis
(substitution fideicommissaire) of the French law and the dis-
position prohibited by the second paragraph of article 40, page
216 (article 1507, Code of 1825; article 1520, Code of 1870) are
identical. They are exactly the same thing.
3. The use of the term "fideicommissa" in the first para-
graph of that article envisaged the disposition described in the
58'. Bernard's Heirs v. Goldenbou, 18 La. 95 (1844).
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second and third paragraphs and could not possibly have had
reference to "trusts" or "trust estates" of the common law.
4. As a consequence, the commentaries of the French juris-
consults in interpreting the prohibition against substitutions in
the Code Napoleon are entitled to great weight here.
LOUISIANA - THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
In 1921, a constitutional convention was held in Louisiana
from which the present constitution resulted. That convention,
for the first time in our history, wrote into the Constitution a
provision (article IV, section 16) which prohibits the legisla-
ture from abolishing forced heirship, or from authorizing sub-
stitutions, fideicommissa or trust estates; except that trust
estates could be permitted for a specified period. This unusual,
and in the opinion of many, unwarranted intrusion into the leg-
islative function, has been amended several times, usually in
direction of liberalizing the period for which trust estates might
be authorized.
At this point in this study it suffices to discuss this provision
as it was originally adopted.
At the outset, it might be said that the prohibition against
"substitutions, fideicommissa and trust estates" surely means
or implies that the convention thought that the phrase "substitu-
tions and fideicommissa" used in the prohibitory article of the
Civil Code was not intended to include by oblique implication
the "trust estates" of the common law. It also means that trust
estates which could be authorized by the legislature were in-
tended to be something separate and apart from "substitutions
and fideicommissa," which terms must be given their technical
meanings according to the civil law. Otherwise the section does
not make sense. This is borne out by the parlimentary history
of the provision in the constitutional convention which adopted
it.58b As originally introduced in the convention, the ordinance
proposing it read: "No law shall be passed abolishing the prin-
ciple of forced heirship, or legalizing substitutions, fideicom-
missa or trusts affecting immovable property." It was referred
to the Committee on Limitations which reported it unfavorably.
When it was returned to the calendar, an amendment was pro-
posed which would make the last clause read:
58 b. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1921.
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"Or legalizing substitutions or fideicommissa or trust
estates; except that the legislature may authorize the crea-
tion of trusts for a period not exceeding ten years which
may be made where a natural person is the direct beneficiary
to run from the date of his majority; and provided further
that this prohibition shall not apply in respect of donations
strictly for educational, charitable or religious purposes."
This amendment was adopted.
Another amendment was proposed which would have added
to the first provision, "No law shall be passed abolishing the
principle of forced heirship," the following: "or impairing the
legitime of forced heirs as now fixed by law." This amendment
was defeated.
Another amendment was adopted adding, after the phrase
"for a period of not exceeding ten years," the words "after the
death of the donor."
As thus amended, the ordinance was finally passed. But the
chairman of the Committee on Limitations made a prophetic
statement when he explained his vote, saying:
"I thoroughly favor the retention in our law of the prin-
ciple of forced heirship. I favor also the limitation of trusts,
though I believe a reasonable protection to woman and chil-
dren as provided by Act 107 of 1920 is beneficial and meets
a real necessity in many cases where relief would otherwise
be denied. I do not think, however, that the restrictions
contained in the ordinance find proper place in our constitu-
tion as they may ultimately prove embarrassing, and for that
reason I vote 'No'."
After the Committee on Coordination had made and reported
some stylistic refinements it made another report in which it
revised the text so as to make it clear that the trust, in case of
a minor, would run during minority and for ten years after
majority. It also revised the last proviso excepting donations
for educational, charitable, and religious purposes from the
"prohibition as to trust estates," by making that phase read
"prohibition as to trust estates, as fideicommissa," an interpo-
lation, if one can judge from the record, that was made for
stylistic reasons only. For if it was intended to do otherwise,
the Committee on Coordination would surely have reported its
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reasons to the convention, as it did in making the change in
language to make it clear that the trust would run during
minority and for ten years after majority.
It is fair to say from this record that the constitutional con-
vention wanted provision for trust estates, but for a limited
time- a period which has been lengthened by amendment voted
by the people.
It is apparent, too, that without this liberalizing amendment,
the original ordinance proposing an absolute prohibition against
substitutions, fideicommissa, and trusts affecting immovable
property might not have been adopted by the convention.
In interpreting this strange constitutional provision, "trust
estates," must be considered something apart from "substitutions
and fideicommissa," which must be given the meaning set forth
in the Civil Code.
We get back to the study made of those terms in the first
part of this study, and for the very same reasons, they cannot
be given any other interpretation here.
By the very language of the Code itself the prohibited sub-
stitution defined there is the disposition by which a "donee, heir
or legatee is charged to preserve and deliver the thing given or
bequeathed to a third person." Such a disposition is a fidei-
commissum. And the Code, by reference to the Trebellianic
portion, in the very next paragraph, definitively ties those pro-
visions to the only institution to which they could apply, the
fideicommissum of the Roman law of Justinian, the substitution
fideicommissaire of French law, and the fideicomisarias of
Spanish law.
Both the French and Spanish refer to the fideicommissum
as a substitution. There were other substitutions, of which our
Code only preserves the vulgar substitution. If the word "sub-
stitution" is given any effect beyond the definition given in the
second paragraph of article 1520, would it not be justifiable to
say that the vulgar substitution was also proscribed by the con-
stitutional prohibition against substitutions?
It was demonstrated in discussing the codal prohibition that
"substitutions and fideicommissa" could have been used only
as synonyms. The same considerations apply with equal force
in considering the import of this constitutional prohibition
against substitutions, fideicommissa, and trust estates.
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Before turning from this constitutional prohibition, it may
be noted that the language of the Constitution prohibiting the
legislature from passing a law abolishing forced heirship does
not mean that it cannot pass a law changing, regulating or
restricting the rights of forced heirs, as for example, authorizing
the placing of the legitime in trust. The records of the constitu-
tional convention show that the proposal to freeze "the legitime
of forced heirs as now fixed by law" was defeated in the conven-
tion.
The question, moreover, has been squarely decided by the
Supreme Court, in a case involving the placing of the legitime
in trust. In Succession of Earhart,59 the Court said:
"The words 'no law, shall be passed abolishing forced
heirship' mean exactly what they say; in other words that
forced heirship cannot be done away with wholly, wiped out
or destroyed. This provision does not prohibit the legisla-
ture from regulating or restricting the rights of forced heirs.
In fact, under the provisions of Article 1493 and 1494 R.C.C.,
the legitime is now restricted by permitting the testator to
dispose of a portion of his estate as he sees fit. Insofar as
the codal articles relating to forced heirship are concerned,
they must bow to the recent statute. Act 81 of 1938; Wilbert
v. Wilbert, 155 La. 197; 99 So. 36."
Conclusion
The constitutional prohibition against substitutions fidei-
commissa and trust estates, except for trust estates for a limited
period, although of doubtful constitutional propriety, neverthe-
less has not been without value in considering this whole sub-
ject. Consider these conclusions:
1. By discussing "trust estates" in the same context with
substitutions and fideicommissa and allowing "trust estates"
for a limited period, the Constitution sets them apart as some-
thing different from "substitutions and fideicommissa."
2. The "substitutions and fideicommissa" referred to in the
Constitution can only be the "substitutions and fideiscommissa"
prohibited by article 1520 of the Civil Code.
3. As defined in that article "substitutions and fideicom-
59. 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
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missa" are used as synonyms, for a disposition in which there
are two liberalities, in which the first beneficiary ("donee, heir
or legatee") is charged to preserve the object of the liberality,
and deliver it to the second beneficiary.
4. If any wider latitude is given to "substitutions and fidei-
commissa" under the Constitution, the vulgar substitution would
be unconstitutional.
5. The term "trust estates" as used in the constitution un-
doubtedly refers to the "trust" or "trust estates" of the common
law as they exist in our sister states, and the Constitution has
left to the legislature the task of determining the manner in
which this alien institution shall operate in this field of the
civil law, and of fixing the limits beyond which it shall not go.
As for the prohibition against abolishing forced heirship, it
is certain that it does not prevent the legislature from placing
the legitime in trust.
A SUGGESTED RATIONALE FOR INTERPRETATION
The commentaries of the French jurists who have discussed
the interpretation of article 896 of the Code of Napoleon are
entitled to great weight in Louisiana, because the substitutions
prohibited by article 1520 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 are
identical with those proscribed by article 896 of the French
Civil Code. They have a common ancestry. French doctrine
must supply the deficiency in Louisiana doctrine, regretably
lacking for so many years.
It is generally considered in France that the prohibition in
article 896 is directed at substitutions fideicommissaires, the
fideiscommissa of the Roman law of Justinian, and not to the
dispositions called substitutions in that law. (The vulgar, pupil-
lary, and exemplary substitutions.)
The quotation from Marcade, given above, 60 expresses French
opinion on this matter. There is no opinion to the contrary.
Previously discussed evidence in this study is cumulative
proof of the correctness of that observation."'
It has likewise been established that the substitution pro-
hibited by the corresponding article of the Louisiana Code, as
60. See pp. 467-470 supra.
61. See discussion of the development of the law relating to substitutions and
fideicommissa in France at pp. 10-19 supra.
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that substitution is defined and delimited by that article, is
exactly the same thing as that prohibited by article 896 of the
Code Napoleon. The second and third paragraphs of article
1520 of the Code of 1870 can only refer to a fidei commissum,
or the identical' fideicommis, or substitution of the French law.
2
It well may be that the redactors of the Louisiana Code con-
sidered that the prohibition applied also to the vulgar, pupillary,
exemplary, and derivative substitutions authorized along with
fideicommissarias by Law XIV, Title V of Partida VI of the
Spanish law. But it is just as plausible to assume that they
intended the, article to apply only to the dispositions described
in the second paragraph. For they authorized vulgar substitu-
tions (article 41, page 218, Code of 1808; article 1508, Code of
1825; article 1521, Code of 1870) ;1 and limited the effect of a
donation mortis causa to the property of the testator (article 3,
page 208, Code of 1808; article 1455, Code of 1825; article 1469,
Code of 1870), as does article 895, of the French Civil Code cited
by Marcade, above.
But that speculation is beside the point here, for there can
be no doubt about the import of the second and third paragraphs
of article, 1520 and the corresponding articles in our earlier
Codes, defining and limiting the prohibition of the first para-
graph against fideicommissa to the same disposition prohibited
by the French Code against substitutions.
We can, therefore, look with much interest and profit to the
commentaries of the French jurists who have done so much to
develop the juridicial interpretation of the French Civil Law,
and the law of the countries which benefitted from a French
legal, inheritance.
Definitions
At the outset it may be well to consider some definitions,
as they are used in French doctrine, for they will be of consider-
able value in developing a rationale of interpretation of this
part of our law which has caused so much difficulty in the past.
Let us turn to one of the commentators who is greatly re-
spected in Louisiana.
Baudry-Lacantiniere says:
62. See discussion relating to Louisiana at p. 462 et seq. and conclusions at
p. 471. supra.
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"3048. Before examining the rule itself posed by Article
896, it is important to give some definitions. They will not
be without value in explaining the devlopment which this
difficult matter requires.
"Fideicommis, fiducie, substitution - such are particu-
larly three terms,: the meanings of which must be clearly
fixed, before undertaking the study of the prohibition con-
tained in Article 996 [sic. - means 896]. We will thus com-
mence by defining them, preoccupying ourselves moreover,
with the scientific exactitude of the definitions.
"We will next hope to see, with respect to Article 896,
if these definitions are in perfect accord with the terminol-
ogy that it was deemed advisable to, adopt in the Civil Code.
"3049. Let us first speak of fideicommis. The fideicom-
mis is a disposition by which one charges a person, favored
in the. first order, to render the thing given or bequeathed,
to another person favored in the second order. It is, for
example, a disposition conceived in the following terms:
'I bequeath such an immovable to Paul, and) I charge him to
render this immovable to Pierre at the end of five years.'
"3050. With the fideicommis thus defined, there may not
be any question of confounding it with fiducie. In the simple
fiducie as in the fideicommis, one likewise charges a person
to render to another the object of the donation or legacy, but,
and it is the essential difference' which distinguishes the
fiducie from the fideiscommis,, the fiduciary is not bene-
fitted, he is only a simple intermediary charged to render.
"Thus a testator has' said: 'I bequeath my properties to
Paul, with the charge of administering them, of capitalizing
the revenues, and of remitting the whole to Pierre, when he
has attained his majority.' Here Pierre is the only legatee;
Paul is only an intermediary, a nudus minister, a testamen-
tary executor invested with a particular mission.
"In the actual state of our practices, the fiducie is seldom
used except to evade the law decreeing incapacities. Thus,
frequent recourse is had to it to benefit unauthorized re-
ligious congregations.
"In sum, that which distinguishes the fiducie from the
fideicommis, is that in the fideicommis there are two succes-
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sive beneficiaries; while in the fiducie, there is only one,
i.e. he to the profit of whom the rendition ought to be made.
"Let us note, however, that the doctrine and particularly
the jurisprudence does not always conform to this termin-
ology. The simple fiducie is often designated under the name
of fideicommis. But it is not unimportant to note that they
are two distinct institutions, to which the same rules can-
not fit.
"3051. With regard to substitution, in general, it is
uniquely, if its etymological origin is adhered to, sub instituo,
an institution in sub-order; that is a disposition by which
a person is called to recieve a liberality, in default of another
person, or after him. There is, for example, a substitution
when the disposition is conceived in the following terms:
'I bequeath all my properties to Pierre, and if he die before
me, I bequeath them to Paul.' -13
This, of course, is the vulgar substitution of the Louisiana
and French Civil Codes, of the Siete Partidas, and of Justinian's
Institutes.
These definitions - fideicommis (it is precisely the same
term used in the French text of the Louisiana Code) (article
1507, Code of 1825; article 40, page 216, Code of 1808), fidueie64
and substitution - must be understood, therefore, as determin-
ing the constituent characteristics and developing a rationale of
interpretation of article 1520 of the Revised Civil Code and its
precursor, article 896 of the Code Napoleon.
Constituent Characteristics of the Substitution Prohibited by
Article 896 of the Code Napoleon and Article 1520
of the Revised Civil Code
A disposition may be considered as a substitution or fidei-
commissum, prohibited by the first paragraph of article 1520
only when it combines the elements or characteristics, expressly
or impliedly demanded by the second paragraph of that article.
Analysis shows that the characteristics of the prohibited sub-
stitution deducible from article 1520, (and its counterpart, 896)
are: (a) There must be a double disposition of the same prop-
63. 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & COLIN, op. cit. supra note 30, Des Donations
Et Des Testaments, ch. VII, "Of Substitutions," p. 490.
64. "Fiducie" is discussed hereafter at p. 483 et seq.
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erty in full ownership; (b) wherein the first beneficiary is
charged to preserve the thing bequeathed and render it to the
second beneficiary; (c) who takes it successively, after the
first beneficiary- i.e., the double disposition must be made in
successive order.6 5
(a) Double Disposition in Full Ownership
The second paragraph of article 1520 (and of French article
896) strikes with nullity "Every dispoisition by which the donee,
the heir or legatee is charged to preserve for and render a thing
to a third person .... ." This necessarily imports two donations
of the same thing in full ownership, to two different persons
in succession. It means, that the ownership of the property will
rest successively in the two beneficiaries one after the other,
by will of the testator. As a result of the obligation of the first
benficiary to preserve the thing bequeathed and render it to
the second beneficiary, it follows that the second beneficiary,
on accrual of his right to receive the thing bequeathed, takes
only indirectly from the testator, but immediately from the
obligated first beneficiary.
Aubry and Rau, one of the most; highly respected commen-
taries in France, says that it follows from this that there is no
prohibited substitution, within the intendment of article 896:66
"When several persons have been called conjointly or one
in default of the others;
"When the usufruct has been given to one and the naked
ownership to the other, Art. 899 C.N.;
65. 11 AUBY & RAu, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694 et seq., at 161 et seq.
In the discussion which follows, concerning the constituent characteristic of the
prohibited substitution, no detailed citations are given to French doctrine orjurisprudence, because there is little controversy, if any, about the basic principles
discussed. The following general references indicate some of the principal com-
mentaries consulted on the subject of the distinctive characteristics of substitu-
tions :
1 GRENIER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 114, 116; 5 TOuLLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL
FRANCIAS nos. 21 to 24 (5th ed. 1830) ; PROUDHON, TRAITE DES DROITS D'Usu-
FRUIT, D'USAGE PERSONNEL ET D'HAnITATION no. 440 et seq. (2d ed. 1836) ; 8
DURANTON, CouRs DE DROIT FRANCAIS SUIVANT LE CODE CIVIL nos. 66, 72 and
86 (4th ed. 1844) ; COIN-DELISLE, op. cit. supra note 8, art. 896 C.N., no. 7;
MARCADE, op. cit. supra note 33, art. 896 C.N., no. 455 et seq.; TROPLONG, DROIT
CIVIL EXPLIQUE no. 104 et seq. (1855) ; 6 Huc, COM-MENTAIRE THEORIQUE A ET
PRATIQUE DE CODE CIVIL no. 13 (1894); 5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra
note 23, no. 285 et seq.; 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, op. cit. supra note 13, no. 1976
et seq.; 7 BEUDANT, COURs DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAiS no. 403 et seq. (2d ed.
1934).
66. 11 AuBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, at 162.
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"When a donation or legacy, made to several persons
called to enjoy it, one after the other, has for its object, not
the ownership but; only the usufruct of all or part of the
property of the disposer ;"
(French doctrine and jurisprudence are unanimous that the
donation of successive usufructs is not a prohibited substitution,
because all rights of the usufructuary cease at its termination,
and he has nothing to render to his successor; consequently the
succeeding usufructuary takes directly from the donor, and not
from the antecedent usufructuary.) 6 7
"When the usufruct of certain property has been be-
queathed to Primus, and the naked ownership to his children,
born and to be born, and in the case of the death of Primus
without children, to Secundus.",
(This is explained in a note, which says that in such a case
Secundus will receive the property directly from the disposer,
and not through, the intervention of Primus, on the head of
whom ownership never would have rested; citing authorities
and cases. Note 6, p. 163)
Double Conditional Legacies -French jurisprudence has
held that, there is no prohibited substitution when a legacy,
apparently in full ownership has been subordinated to a sus-
pensive condition, with a provision that if this condition fail,
a third person would take the things. bequeathed. An illustration
of this is the legacy made for the benefit of Primus, on condi-
tion that he marry, or that he marry, before a certain date, or
that he live to be a certain age, but with the proviso that if the
condition be not fulfilled, Secundus, will take the property be-
queathed.
In declaring such a legacy valid, and not a prohibited sub-
stitution, French jurisprudence is based on these considerations:
(1) It constitutes two legacies under a suspensive condi-
tion, the first legacy under the condition described in the illustra-
tion, the second legacy under the condition of the failure of the
condition of the first legacy.
(2) As a result of the retroactivity of the condition, the
second legatee (Secundus) is considered as receiving the prop-
67. Ibid.; 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, Op. cit. supra note 30, no. 3166; 5
PLANIOL & lIPERT, Op. Cit. supra note 23, no. 294; 34 CARPENTIER-DU SAINT, op.
cit. supra note 19, Verbo Sub8titutions, no. 427 et 8eq.
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erty not after the first legatee (Primus), but in default of him,
and there is no successive order.
(3) There is no real charge to preserve and render resting
on the first legatee.
(4) In such a case, the testator will be considered to have
bequeathed the usufruct to Primus for the period intervening
between his receipt of the legacy and the failure of the condi-
tion, even if he has not so specified.
(5) In some instances, the courts have annulled a condi-
tional legacy (e.g." I bequeath my property to X if he attain
21 years; if he die before that this legacy will fail and be as not
written."), as containing a resolutory condition. However, the
jurisprudence generally has validated double conditional legacies
of the type given in the illustration, where the testator intends
to maintain the first legacy, only if the legatee attains a cer-
tain age, or accomplishes a) fact before a certain age, without
being concerned with whether the condition is resolutory or
suspensive.
(6) Some earlier decisions have annulled double conditional
dispositions as substitutions prohibited by article 896 of the
French Code, where the legacy is made to the first legatee with
the stipulation that, if he die without children, the property be-
queathed will be attributed to another.
But subsequent jurisprudence has validated this type of
double conditional legacy, on the basis that the happening of
the condition (the death of legatee without children) operated
retroactively, and the substituted legatee received the property
directly from the testator, and not through the first legatee as
intermediary.
This later jurisprudence has received vigorous support as
not at all contrary to the spirit of the Civil Code underlying the
prohibition against substitutions.
"It does not suffice," say Aubry and Rau, "to justify it,
to invoke the retroactivity of the condition, because it re-
mains true that, in the mind of the testator (disposer) there
are two successive legatees, if the condition is realized, which
should put an end to the first legacy. In a certain sense there
is a charge to preserve and render. But there is a great dif-
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ference between that one who pretends to regulate impera-
tively the transmission of his property to the heirs of his
heirs, and particularly to their descendents, and him who,
foreseeing the case where his legatee would have no children,
prescribes a new destination for the thing bequeathed. It is
the will of the individual to regulate the transmission of his
property for several generations in the way of which it was
desired to put obstacles by means of Article 896. This will
does not exist when the testator first foresees, and hopes
that the legatee would have descendants, and leaves him, in
this case, full freedom to dispose of the property bequeathed
to him. Moreover, contrary to what takes place in the true
substitution, no person not yet conceived at the death of the
testator may benefit from the second conditional legacy.
Finally, the double conditional legacy does not bring to the
free transmission of property more of an obstacle than any
other conditional legacy and the law does not prohibit con-
ditional legacies."68
It must not be thought from all of this that the character of
a prohibited substitution cannot be attributed to any double
legacy, for French courts still occasionally annul double disposi-
tions, e.g., (a) universal legacy to X in order that after his
death the entire inheritance would return to the testator's
nephews; (b) legacy to a nephew and his wife, expressly with a
substitution for the benefit of their children, and if they die
without children, to another nephew; (c) legacy or property
with provision that it be preserved and transmitted to descend-
ants.
This phase of French juridical opinion is interesting and of
importance here in Louisiana for it shows that there is no blind
prejudice against double dispositions. On the other hand, the
prohibition of article 896 has been confined in its application
to dispositions which would generate the evils which the redac-
tors of the Code Napoleon, animated by the spirit of the Revolu-
tion, wanted to suppress - that is to say, dispositions whereby
the first legatee, given the ownership of a thing, is required to
preserve it and deliver it to the second legatee, who takes in
succession from the first legatee.
Distinction Between Fiducie and Fideicommis (Prohibited
Substitution) - Fiducie. It has been indicated before, in this
68. 11 AUBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, n. 7-7, at 165.
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study, that in France there is a distinction between a fiducie
and a fideicommis- a fiducie being perfectly lawful while a
fideicommis is prohibited.
A fiducie is a disposition by which a person is instituted
legatee for form only and has been charged with holding the
things bequeathed and administering them up to the designated
time of delivery, not for himself, but for the benefit of the real
legatee; this charge of rendering to the second, or real legatee,
imposed on the apparent legatee is called fiducie.0 9
The determination of the question of whether a particular
disposition is a simple fiducie, or a prohibited fideicommis (sub-
69. This is the definition given by the jurists, among whom are: 1 TROPLONG,
op. cit. supra note 62, nos. 109, 110; 18 DEMOLOMBE, CoURs DE CODE NAPOLEON,
nos. 104-106 (1876); 14 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
nos. 402, 403 (1878) ; 6 Huec, op. cit. supra note 62, no. 15; 11 AUBY & RAU,
op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, at 167-68; 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, op. cit. supra
note 30, nos. 3088-90; ROLLAND DR VILLARGUES, DES SUBSTImTIONS PROHIBEES,
nos. 153, 154 (3d ed. 1833) ; THEVENOT D'ESSAULT DE SAVIGNY, TRAITn DES
SUBSTITUTIONS FIDEICOMMISSAIRE, no 541 (1778) ; 6 MERLIN, Op. cit. supra note
22, Verbo Fiducaire (Heretier) discusses this institution and cites as its origins
in Roman law: Law 33 D. De Usuris; Law 46, D. Ad Senatus-Consultum Tre-
bellianum (D36.1.46) ; Law 78 of same Sen. Con. (36.1.78. 12) ; Law 43. 3 D.
De Legatis 20; Law 21. 2 D. de Annuis Legatis.
In the first volume of the French Reports of Jurisprudence (Journal Du
Palais 1, p. 134) in Vignier V.N ...................... (Decided 18 Frimaire an V) it was
said that "The fiducie is a testamentary disposition by means of which, in insti-
tuting a person as heir, but for form only, the testator charges that person to
administer the succession and preserve it up to the moment when he ought to
deliver it to the real heir and that is ordinarily his majority. It is a sort of tutor-
ship or mandate. This kind of disposition which was authorized by the Romans,
was sometimes practiced in our former jurisprudence. It is not contrary to prin-
ciple; thus M. Merlin and Rolland De Villargues . . . that it was always author-
ized under the empire of the Civil Code."
34 CARPENTIER-DU SAINT, op. cit. supra note 19, Verbo Substitutions: "75. It
results that there is no substitution . . . 3 in case of a simple fiducie, when a
person, instituted only for form, and in no way benefitted in reality, holds the
things in his hands for the account and in the interest of the real beneficiary to
whom he must render them (see infra no. 3313) 4 a fortiori when the disposer
confides to a person whom he does not desire to benefit, the execution of his
wishes by charging him to deliver, but only at the end of a certain delay. In such
a case the pretended obligated beneficiary is only an agent (mandataire). These
ought to be considered, for example, not as legatees burdened with a substitution,
but as testamentary executors, individuals, to whom a testator has bequeathed all
his property with the charge to sell them and give the price to a third person.
Paris 28 June 1869 (Bull. D'Arr De La Cour De Paris 1869, p. 247) and Article
896 in speaking of a legatee or donee, it is certain that the testamentary executor,
although obligated to render, is not a burdened beneficiary in the sense of this
article, since he is not the owner of the things he is obligated to deliver. . ....
For a comparison of the characteristics by which a fiducie is distinguished
from a substitution: MERLIN, op. cit. supra note 22, Verbo Fiducaire, no. 3; 1
TROPLONG, op. cit. supra note 62, nos. 109, 110; 18 DEMOLOMBE, Op. cit. supra
note 66, no. 105; 14 LAURENT, op. cit. supra note 66, no. 403; 11 BAUDRY-LACAN-
TINERIE, op. cit. supra note 30, no. 3088; 6 Huc, op. cit. supra note 62, no. 15;
5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra note 23, no. 290; Civ. 18 Frimaire An V:
Sir. 1.1.99; Req. 8 August 1808: Sir. 8-1-505; Nimes 17 August 1808: Sir. 10-2.
554; Toulouse 18 May 1824: D.25.1-23; Nimes 16 December 1833; Sir. 35.2.333.
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stitution) is left to the evaluation of the judge. To decide this
question he should look to the terms of the testament and all
the circumstances of fact to determine if the intention of the
testator was to institute the first legatee more in the interest
of the second legatee than himself. The criterion here is the
effect of the bequest on the first legatee, burdened with the
obligation to administer and to deliver to the second legatee. If
his interest, in his own behalf, is considerable, as, for example,
the right to retain all of the fruits produced by the property
bequeathed, then there is a veritable fideicommis, or prohibited
substitution. But the right to retain only a part of the fruits,
or one or several of the things bequeathed, seems indicative of
a simple fiducie. It seems to the writer that where the part of
the fruits, or the things retained, might be equated with rea-
sonable compensation for the services required in administering
the bequest for the second, or real legatee, a fiducie would be
clearly indicated.
In France there is general accord in considering that a
fiducie is indicated by these circumstances: the ultimate or
second beneficiary is a minor child of the testator. The first
legatee is his nearest relative in his confidence, and delivery to
the second legatee is to take place after he attains majority.
But the concurrence of all of these circumstances is not neces-
gary to characterize a disposition as a simple fiducie.
Although this device, fiducie, is perfectly legal in France, it
is not used very much. All of this is very well explained by a
distinguished French jurist in discussing Civil Law Substitutes
for Trust,7 0 in the course of which he said:
"If one uses such an approach, one will find, as will be
shown later, that there is one right in rem that is remark-
ably similar to that created by a great many trusts - this
is fiducia. This technique, much closer to trusts than the
fideicommissum, with which it is generally compared, is no
longer in use, but it still is in existence and can be utilized."
(p. 1127)
"The scheme that has just been outlined '(deposit)'
need not be used, since the civil law affords a technique
which achieves the same practical results in a more direct
and easy way. We refer to the fiducia, which has been con-
70. Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes For Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126-47 (1933).
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sidered so much like the trust that it has been used as its
French translation in the Province of Quebec. Curiously
enough, the civil law has not understood all the advantages
that can be derived from the use of the fiducia. While it is
now nearly forgotten by text writers and practitioners, it
is not dead, and has recently been recognized by courts as
perfectly legal. We hope that new life can be infused into
this old juristic institution, dormant for centuries, so that
substantial social service may be rendered by it. Fiducia
is the real substitute for a trust; it is its twin institution,
since not only are the same functions fulfilled by it, but the
same methods are used to achieve them. In both there is a
transfer of property to one who has the legal title but derives
no personal advantage from it, and who must manage the
property for the benefit of someone else, while his own credi-
tors cannot attach it. While, however, the trust is now a
thoroughly developed device, and the rights and duties of
each party to it are well settled, the fiducia has never (p.
1138) been of great importance in civil law countries - ex-
cept in the province of Quebec- and rights and liabilities
arising under it are far from being precisely determined.
Hence we conclude that in the fiducia the civil law has a
legal technique which can easily be developed along the same
lines as the trust, if text-writers and practitioners are far-
sighted enough to perceive what can be done with it." (p.
1139)
In conclusion he says:
"If one takes an analytical point of view in the study of
comparative law, one is in many instances liable to take a
road that leads nowhere. Such would be the case in dealing
with the subject of the present article. But if one takes a
decidedly functional viewpoint, things immediately appear
in a new light. From such a viewpoint we conclude that in
several cases, the civil law has no substitute for trusts, be-
cause it would be contrary to its policy to sanction their
results, but that in all other cases the same results may be
reached quite adequately, although often through widely dif-
ferent means.
"The civil law has a real substitute for the trust, the
fiducia, but it has failed to understand the use that can be
made of it. Civilians have therefore used many different
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techniques to cope with situations usually dealt with by
trusts in England and America. The complications, the di-
versity, the precision and often the narrowness of these
techniques are without a doubt a weakness. It is a great
asset in a legal system to have an adaptable device at the
crossroads of all legal institutions, and one which fulfills
many social functions at the same time. It is the writer's
hope that Anglo-Saxon jurists will assist their civilian
brethren in reviving and developing the long forgotten
fiducia." (p. 1147)
Here it is important to consider that from a functional view-
point, much of the common law trust can be achieved in the
civil law through the almost dormant technique of the fiducie,
centuries old but still valid and upheld by the courts. And that,
important in itself, should dissipate the mistaken, nebulous be-
lief that the trust is abhorrent to the Civil Law. As Lepaulle
says: "The significant thing is that in a trust qua trust there is
nothing shocking to the mind of civil law jurists, as far as rights
in personam are concerned."
(b) Charge to Preserve and Render
According to article 1520 of the Revised Civil Code and 896
of the Code Napoleon, the second essential element of a pro-
hibited substitution is the charge imposed on the instituted heir,
donee, or legatee by the disposer (testator) to preserve the
thing bequeathed and deliver it to a third party, i.e., the second
beneficiary.
French doctrine and jurisprudence have established some
rules interpreting this requirement. They are:
(1) Simple advice or recommendation to preserve and de-
liver the things bequeathed is not equivalent to a charge to pre-
serve and deliver, within the intendment of article 896, and
hence there is no prohibited substitution. There is no substitu-
tion if the testator makes a simple request of the first bene-
ficiary, who complies with it, and expressly so declares, nor
would there be a prohibited substitution where the testator ex-
presses a simple wish that the property be transmitted to a
third person, even when his instructions for its preservation
are obligatory.
(2) The charge to preserve and deliver need not be couched
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in the terms of article 896, if it results necessarily from the
tenor of the disposition.7 1 Thus, the charge to preserve and ren-
der it necessarily implied in the following dispositions:
"I institute Pierre and after he has received (the property)
I substitute his children for him";
"I institute Pierre and I wish that after him my property
will be returnable to Paul."
(3) A prohibited substitution likewise results from the
prohibition imposed by the testator on the donee or legatee,
against alienation of the things bequeathed to the prejudice of
his children (or other heirs, or of those of the testator, when
this prohibition must be in force during the life of the first
beneficiary.)
It may also result from the method of employment of things
bequeathed imposed on the legatee for the same purpose. This
rule has its counterpart in the situation where it results from
the ensemble of the dispositions in the testament that the first
legatee is placed in the necessity of alienating all or part of the
things bequeathed in order to execute them: there is then, an
element of fact, exclusively by itself of all prohibited substitu-
tions.
(4) The charge to preserve and deliver does not necessarily
result from the following:
The prohibition against making a will or even of alienating
out of the family;
The obligation imposed on the legatee to institute such a
person as his heir;
The obligation to place the sums bequeathed in non-transfer-
able securities;
When the disposition says: "I bequeath to such a one, and
substitute such a one to him," such terms being not in general
considered as importing the charge to preserve and render.
71. 11 AUBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, at 170, note 18, is to the effect
that the terms "charge de conserver et de rendre" are not sacramental.
"The terms 'charged to preserve and render' are not sacramental; and on that
account alone that the second paragraph of Art. 896 does not require, in order
that there be a substitution, that the donee be literally charged to preserve
and render, it suffices that this charge results as a necessary consequence,
from the terms, or the general import of the disposition."
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(5) The legacy de residuo, that is to say, the disposition
by which the legatee is charged to transmit at his death the
rseidue of the things bequeathed, does not constitute a pro-
hibited substitution, because it does not import the essential
charge to preserve and render.
To the same effect is the disposition which permits the
legatee, charged to preserve and render, to sell or encumber
the property bequeathed in case of need.
But this authorization to alienate in case of need is not
exclusive of the charge to preserve.
The freedom given the first beneficiary to make with the
second beneficiary such arrangements as are mutually agree-
able so long as the will of the testator is faithfully executed,
does not exclude the charge to preserve.
(6) At one time it was held that fungible things might
be made the object of a substitution only if the testator pre-
scribed the manner of their use, but more recently it has been
held that a double disposition may constitute a prohibited sub-
stitution, even when it relates to fungible things, as for example
on the third of a succession in movable securities and properties.
(7) In the case a rent is bequeathed to its debtor (consti-
tuting a legacy of liberation) but it is bequeathed to a third
person, if the debtor die without children, it has been held that
there is no substitution, because, the two legacies, not having
the same object, there is no obligation to preserve and render.
These rules should be considered if similar questions should
arise in Louisiana for the charge to "preserve and deliver" is
an essential ingredient of prohibited substitution under Art.
1520.
(a) Successive Order- According to Aubry and Rau, in
order to consider that a double disposition contains a prohibited
substitution, it is necessary that the legatee first gratified be
obligated to preserve the thing bequeathed, during his lifetime,
in order to render it, at his death, to the legatee in the second
order. This is the characteristic modality which, having in view
the result of taking away the things substituted from the estate
of the obligated beneficiary, and of putting them in the patri-
mony of the second beneficiary, constitutes that which is called
"successive order" in the matter of substitutions.
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As a consequence there is no substitution where the legatee
has been obligated to transmit the things given immediately,
or after the expiration of a fixed delay, not even where the
charge imposed upon him is susceptible of realization during his
lifetime.
This charge to preserve during the first legatee's lifetime
does not need to be literally expressed, but it does not result
from the indeterminate charge to deliver (render) without
other addition or explanation. The charge "to preserve for a
third person" extends to the entire life of the obligated bene-
ficiary, if it has been imposed on him without any time limita-
tion.
It has been held that a prohibited substitution results:
Where the charge to transmit was subordinated to a nega-
tive act by the burdened legatee or to a condition not susceptible
of proof until his death;
Where the donee is charged to bequeath the donated im-
movable to a third person;
Where the disposer stipulates for a right of return either to
disposer's heirs or a third person, without at the same time
stipulating the return for himself, in case the donee or legatee
die without posterity;
Where the disposition provides "I bequeath my property to
Paul; but, if he die without children I intend that this legacy
be without effect."
This brief comment on the successive order as an essential
characteristic of the prohibited substitution, taken from the
French, should be of interest also in Louisiana because of the
identity of the texts.
Conclusion
The characteristics of the substitution prohibited by article
1520 of the Revised Civil Code are the same as those of the
substitution prohibited by article 896 of the Code Napoleon
because the texts are the same and relate to the same institution.
In order that a disposition fall within the prohibition, these
things must concur:
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(A) A double disposition of the same thing in full owner-
ship;
(B) Wherein the first beneficiary is charged to preserve
the thing bequeathed and transmit it to the second beneficiary;
(C) Who takes it successively, i.e., in successive order.
There is nothing in the texts which would justify any dif-
ferent interpretation in Louisiana.
Principles of Interpretation
The faculty of disposition is a natural and essential function
of the ownership of property. That is the philosophy underlying
article 1713 of the Code of 1870 which reads:
"A disposition must be understood in the sense in which it
can have effect, rather than that in which it can have none."
This article is an editorial derivative from article 201, p.
252, Code of 1808, which literally reproduces article 137 of Title
IX, Book III, Projet du Government (1800) for the French Civil
Code. The proposed article was not adopted, but French doc-
trine is in accord.7
2
In the matter of substitutions, favored in Roman law, a
latitudinerian approach by which the existence of a substitution
could be found by interpretation would be in extension of this
faculty of disposition, while in France, and also in Louisiana,
the prohibition against substitutions is in derogation of that
faculty, and should be strictly construed, and limited to those
cases clearly falling within the terms of the second paragraph
of the prohibitory article.
French law so holds, and follows the rule that the testator
in writing his last will is considered to have written nothing
that was useless, and his expressions ought to be construed in
a manner most favorable to procuring the effects authorized
by law. But in the case of substitutions, generally prohibited
by present French law, in determining whether a disposition
does or does not contain a prohibited substitution, application
72. The following citations are authority for the principle in the interpretation
of testaments generally: 5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra note 23, no. 18, at 24;
COIN-DELISLE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 447, no. 10; the following are authority
for the same principle but relate to substitutions, etc., specifically: 1 TROPLONG,
op. cit. supra note 62, no. 117, at 177; 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & COLIN, Op. Cit.
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should be made of the rule that when in doubt, a testator is not
to be considered as having wished to do that which the law pro-
hibited, and still less that which would bring about he destruc-
tion of the principal disposition.78
This leads to this rule of interpretation: When a disposition,
attacked as containing a substitution, is susceptible of two in-
terpretations, one that it contains the essential characterisitcs
of the substitution prohibited by the Code, and the other that it
does not contain them, and the real intention of the testator can-
not be ascertained from the terms used (article 1712) and all
of the circumstances (article 1715) 74 it is preferable to adopt
that interpretation which conduces to the maintenance and not
the caducity of the disposition.,
The application of this rule, in French juridical opinion,
leads, among others to the following consequences:
(a) A disposition in terms applying equally to a case where
the first beneficiary die before the testator (in that case a valid
vulgar substitution), and where he die after the testator (in
that case a prohibited fideicommissary substitution), will be
considered as providing for a vulgar substitution. Thus, "I in-
stitute Pierre, and in case of decease (or after his death) I put
Paul in his place," would be construed as a vulgar substitution.
supra note 30, no. 3176, at 553-4; 18 DEMOLOMBE, op. cit. supra note 66, no. 157,
at 169; 3 COLIN & CAPITA I-T, op. cit. supra note 13, no. 1981; 34 CARPENTIER-
Du SAINT, op. cit. supra note 19, Verbo Substitutions, nos. 582-611; 5 TOULLIER,
op. cit. supra note 62, nos. 44, 50.
73. 11 AUBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, note 45, at 181: "Art.
1157. The application of this rule of interpretation to acts attacked as containing
a substitution is incontestable, since a violation of the prohibition against sub-
stitutions imports not only the nullity of the charge to preserve and render, but
even that of the principal disposition, and it is not to be presumed that the donor
or testator had wished to do that which the law prohibited, under penalty of the
nullity of the entire disposition." Citing 16 MERLIN, op. cit. supra note 22, Verbo
Substitution Jfideicommissaire, § 8, no. 7; 5 TOULLIER, op. cit. supra note 62,
nos. 44, 50; 1 TROPLONG, op. cit. supra note 62, no. 117 and a number of cases.
74. Thus 11 AuBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, at 181, n. 44 says that:
"The rule of interpretation posed by Art. 1157 is only subsidiary; the ambiguity
of a clause, in that which concerns the existence of any one of the constituent
elements of a substitution, authorizes the judge to apply this rule only to the
extent that the doubt resulting from this ambiguity cannot be dispelled by an
examination and reconciliation of all of the clauses of the act." The rule to which
reference is made is similar to the rule of Louisiana Civil Code article 1951:
"When a clause is susceptible of two interpretations, it must be understood in
that in which it may have some effect rather than in a sense which would render
it nugatory." For an application of such a rule of interpretation in Louisiana see
Succession of Feitel, 176 La. 543, 146 So. 145 (1933), and the very early case
of Farrar v. McCutcheon, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 45 (La. 1825).
75. 11 AUnRy & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, at 181. n. 45.
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Again: "I institute Pierre, and if he die without children, I
substitute Paul for him" has been sometimes considered as a
vulgar substitution, and sometimes as a fideicommissary substi-
tution, according to the circumstances of the particular case.
(b) When the principal legacy is subordinated to a condi-
tion, accompanied by a subsidiary legacy in case the condition
be not accomplished, and the condition may be construed as sus-
ceptible of realization either at the death of the testator, or that
of the principal legatee, the disposition should be regarded more
as a conditional legacy with a vulgar substitution than as a
fideicommissary substitution. Thus: "I leave such to Primus,
and if he does not marry I substitute Secundus in his place. '76
(c) When the terms of a disposition, attacked as containing
a prohibited substitution, may be construed as only expressing
a right of accretion between co-legatees, they ought to be inter-
preted preferably in this sense, although in this case the accre-
tion would operate by virtue of law and independently of stipu-
lation. So with legacies made conjointly to several persons with
the proviso that in case of predecease of one or more of them,
the survivors would receive the totality of the legacy, provided,
however, the terms of the will are not opposed to the assumption
that the testator had in view the hypothesis where one or more
of the legatees would die during his lifetime. Generally, it would
be likewise even thoungh the testator had established the right
of accretion only in the case where one or several of the legatees
would die without children.
(d) When the terms of a disposition, to several persons suc-
cessively, one after the other, leave doubt as to whether the tes-
tator intended to bequeath the ownership or the usufruct to the
first legatee, interpretation that usufruct was intended should
be adopted.
(e) If a disposition attacked as a prohibited substitution
may be construed as a disposition de eo quod superit, it should
76. These cases are cited by 11 AUBRY & RAU, op. cit. supra note 22, § 694, at
182, n. 48, in which it is said that: "It has been held that the clause: 'I institute
Pierre and, at his death, his children born and to 'be born, with the charge for
him to transmit intact the said heritage to his children,' if null insofar as it con-
cerns Pierre, as the principal disposition burdened with a substitution, may be,
in effect, considered to be valid, in so far as it concerns children born, the disposer
being reputed in effect, to have foreseen the particular causes which would prevent
the disposition in the first order taking effect. Req. 7 mai 1900: Sir. 1901. 1.
189."
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be construed as the latter. Thus there is no substitution where
a legacy is made to several persons to use, enjoy, and dispose of
in the most absolute manner, although it is accompanied by a
clause that if one of the legatees die without posterity after the
testator, his portion would devolve by accretion to the other co-
legatees.
(f) Finally, as it has been discussed heretofore,7 7 jurispru-
dence has placed many double conditional legacies beyond the
reach of the nullity pronounced by article 896 of the Code Na-
poleon.
These examples illustrate the restrictive philosophy of
French doctrine and jurisprudence in the interpretation of ar-
ticle 896 and there is nothing in Louisiana law to make them in-
applicable here.
The fact is that in one of the very first cases concerned with
substitutions under the Louisiana Civil Code that came before
the Supreme Court of Louisiana the court adopted this basic
philosophy of interpretation from the French commentators.7 8
It said:
"The question, which now occurs to us for the first time,
77. See p. 481 supra.
78. Farrar v. McCutcheon, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 45 (La. 1825). The French authori-
ties cited with authority were: 5 TOULLIER, Op. Cit. surpa note 65, at 58, 69;
4 PANDECTES FRANCAISES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 21; MERLIN, QUESTION DE
DROIT; 5 TOULLIER, Op. Cit. supra note 65, no. 44, at 58, in translation says:
"44. The general spirit of the law, that of the jurisprudence of the Royal
Courts and of the Court of Cassation, is to annul a disposition made since the
Code, only when it necessarily presents a substitution, and may not be sustained
or interpreted in any other manner."' (Emphasis added.)
'This is a principle posed by the Court of Besancon, in a decision of 28 March
1811, reported in the Recueil De Jurisprudence De Droit Civil. T. XVI, p. 217.
5 ToULLIER, op. cit. supra note 65, no. 50, at 69, in translation, reads:
"50. It is impossible to foresee all the questions which may give rise to an
infinity of particular cases; but all of the difficulties they may present, can be
resolved by applying with discretion these two fundamental principles:
"One, that, if the clause is susceptible of two interpretations, it is always
necessary to interpret it in the sense which does not present a substitution, and
which tends to validate the disposition, because the testator is never considered
to have desired to do that which the law prohibits, still less that which would
bring about the destruction of his desires;
"The other, that every time the act is conceived in such a manner that it
necessarily included the charge to preserve and transmit, even though not literally
expressed, without it being possible to attribute a different meaning to it, proper
to maintain the will of the testator, in the eyes of the law the disposition is null
as containing a substitution ; it is null with respect to the substitution, because
it is contrary to the law which the testator has wish to elude; it is null with re-
spect to the institution or principal legacy, because it is certain that the testator
has desired to give only with the charge to transmit, and it is uncertain if he has
wanted to give without this charge." (Emphasis added.)
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has, however, been considerably agitated in various tribunals
of the kingdom of France, and we are aided by many deci-
sions in cases depending on the 896th Article of the Code Na-
poleon which is similar to our code, on the subject of substi-
tutions and fideicommissa. It is true, that from a hasty view
they seem to be somewhat contradictory in themselves, but
on a closer inspection and more minute investigation they
are capable of being pretty well reconciled. From them and
commentaries on the French Code, several axioms or general
principles are deducible which we believe to be correct.
"1st. The dispositions of testaments ought not to be an-
nulled, until they necessarily present a substitution.
"2nd. If the claim be susceptible of two interpretations,
it ought to be interpreted in that way, which avoids a substi-
tution and gives effect to the will.
"3rd. Whenever the disposition is made in such terms
as necessarily to comprehend a charge to keep for and trans-
mit to a third person, it contains a substitution although not
literally expressed. 5 Toullier 58 & 69.
"It may also be safety admitted as true, that in every
substitution or fideicommissum, the agency of three persons
is required, viz., the donor or testator, the person who re-
ceives the donation to hold and enjoy for a certain time, and
one to whom he is bound to transmit it. See Pandects Fran-
caises Vol. 4 p. 21. A quotation from Merlin Quest. De
Droit."
We shall see in Part II hereof, in what manner these adopted
principles have been followed in Louisiana jurisprudence.
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ANNEX 2. PREAMBLE TO ORDINANCE OF AUGUST 1747
ON SUBSTITUTIONS
Isambert, DeCrusy & Taillandier,
Recueil General Des Anciennes Lois Francaises.
Depuis L'an 420 Jusqfia La Revolution De 1789. (1830)
"D'Aguesseau, Chancellor -August 1747.
(Volume XXII)
No. 629. Ordinance Concerning Servitudes (pp. 193-195)
At the camp of the Commandery of Vieux-Jonc, August 1747. Reg. P.P 27
March 1748 (Archiv)"
"Louis, etc. in the spirit of the resolution which we made to put an end to the
uncertainty and the diversity of decision rendered by the various courts of our
kingdom, although based on the same laws, the matter of donations inter-vivos
and that of testaments appeared to us, because of their importance, to require that
they be the first objects of our attention, and were made the subject of our
ordinances of February 1731 and August 1735. We now propose to establish the
uniformity of jurisprudence with respect to substitutions fideicommissaires, which
may be made by either kind of disposition; but the matter of fideicommis very
simple in its origin, has become much more complex, since substitutions have
begun to be extended, not only to several persons called one after the other, but
to several degrees, or to a long succession of generations. By that means a new
sort of succession has been created, where the will of man, taking the place of
the law, has caused the establishment of a new order of jurisprudence, which has
been accepted all the more favorably, since it was regarded as tending to the
conservation of patrimony, or families, and of giving to the most illustrous houses
the means to maintain their position; but the great number of difficulties which
resulted, either on account of the interpretation of the wishes, often equivocal, of
the donor or testator, or of the composition of his patrimony, or of the different
distractions of which the fideicommissa are susceptible, or of the subsidiary re-
course of the wife against the things burdened with the fideicommissum, has given
rise to an infinity of lawsuits, which have been seen to revive several times at
each opening of the fideicommissum; so that because of an event contrary to the
views of the author of the substitution, it happens that that which he had ordered
for the advantage of his family, sometimes has brought about its ruin. On the
other hand, the necessity of assuring and favoring freedom of commerce, having
required of the wisdom of the law, that it establish the formalities necessary to
make substitutions public, the negligence of those who were required to comply
with these formalities, has become a new source of litigation, where the decisions
of the judges have been suspended between the favor of a creditor, or an acquirer
in good faith, and that of a substitute who ought not to be deprived of the things
substituted, through the fault of him who was charged to deliver them to him.
It is on account of all of these considerations, that, after obtaining the opinions
of the principal magistrates of our Parliaments, and of the superior councils of
our kingdom, which have made us an exact account of the jurisprudence of their
different jurisdictions, we have believed that the two principal objects in the mat-
ter of fideicommissa required that we divide this law into two different titles.
The first will comprehend all that which concerns substitutions-fideicommissaire,
considered in themselves, and the right which may be exercised over the things
substituted. The second will be concerned with the obligations imposed on those
burdened with a substitution, either to direct the kind of publicity they must give,
or to assure the constitution and usage of the effects involved, or for the expedi-
tion and determination of disputes arising in such an important matter; if the
multitude and the subtlety of the abstract question with which it is filled, the
opposition which reigns in this respect, not only between the opinions of the most
celebrated jurisconsults, but between the decisions of the most enlightened courts,
and the necessity of resolving doubts where the weight of the opposing opinions
is almost equal, makes the choice between conflicting opinions so difficult, have
retarded longer than we desired, the publication of this ordinance. We hope that
our people will be compensated for it by the great attention which we have given
to placing it in the state of perfection of which it is susceptible. Far from giving
the least restraint to the freedom to make substitutions, we propose only to make
them more useful for families, and our application to prevent all arbitrary inter-
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pretations by means fixed and uniform rules, will serve only to cause greater
respect for the wishes of donors and testators, by requiring them only to explain
themselves in the most express manner. It is thus that we will give to our sub-
jects a new proof of the care which we take to maintain good order within our
kingdom, through the authority of our laws, at the same time that we are most
occupied in defending it otherwise than by force of arms, whose principal object
is to procure the great benefit of peace for a people so worthy of our affection
through its attachment for our person, and by the zeal which it shines forth more
and more every day for our service. For these reasons, etc. we wish and we are
pleased with this which follows :"
ANNEX 3. COMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAaOL (1951)
MANRESA
TITLE III, CHAPTER II, § 3, OF SuBsTITUTioNs, P. 139 ET SEQ.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION - INTRODUCTORY COMMENT (P. 6-7)
ARTICLES 774, 775, 776, 777, 781
TEXT IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH. COMMENT IN ENGLISH P. 7-11
The testator may designate not only the heirs whom he desires should enjoy
the inheritance at his death, but is also permitted by law to make a second or
ulterior call for the case in which the instituted heir or legatee first named by him
be unwilling or unable to accept the inheritance or legacy, or dies without being
able to dispose of his estate; and not only is he authorized to do this, but he can
also leave the inheritance to one person charged with delivering it to another
either in whole or in part.
This new call which the testator has the faculty of making is what has always
been known as 8ubstitution.
In its broadest and most precise sense, the substitution is, as stated by Roguin,
"the disposition whereby a third party is called to take a hereditary asset (total
or partial inheritance or legacy) in default of a person first designated, or after
such person." From the last phrase in this definition it is clear that there are two
principal species of substitutions: (1) when the substitute receives the thing in
default of the person first instituted and who does not want to, or cannot accept
it (direct substitution) ; (2) when the substitute receives the thing after the per-
son first instituted has enjoyed the gift during a stated time (indirect, oblique,
or gradual substitution). There are vast differences between the two. (a) In the
direct substitution there are several donations, one of which is immediate and the
other or others eventual, but only one of which is executed (for in the end it is
only the substitute or the substituted who inherits), while in the indirect substitu-
tion there are two or more donations which are effectively executed one after the
other. (b) In the direct substitution the testator organizes the transmission of
his estate in favor of one or several heirs who may dispose of it and who are not
obligated to make restitution, while in the indirect substitution the first bene-
ficiary has the obligation of preserving the property for the benefit of one or
several subsequent beneficiaries, and, thus, his freedom of disposition is impeded
or, at least, restrained. (c) The importance of the direct substitution is the elim-
ination of the successors ab intestato; the indirect substitution, on the other hand,
has a considerable social impact because it interferes with the free alienation of
property, for which reason it has been prohibited or limited by certain laws.
The preceding observations comprise, within their terms, the most complete
definition of the substitution that can be given. Ordinarily, it is defined by some
authors with reference only to the case where the instituted heir refuses to, or
cannot accept the inheritance, in which case there is truly a personal transmission
from the testator to the substitute; but besides this direct substitution, the law
has recognized another indirect substitution in cases where the instituted heir dies
while yet a minor or in a state of insanity, permitting the testator to make any
disposition he might deem convenient with respect to the succession of the prop-
erty, and it even authorizes the substitution to take effect after the instituted
heir has received the inheritance on condition of returning it to another either
in whole or in part. . ..
500 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
In truth and in fact, the substitution is nothing more than the subsidiary in-
stitution of a second or ulterior heir or legatee, subordinated to another principal
institution which depends upon an event more or less certain to happen, that is
to say, a conditional institution.
In Roman law, the substitution was necessarily important because of the im-
plied accretion of inheritances under that law. The Partidas devoted to it the
fourteen laws of Article 5, Partida 6, and the jurisprudence has constantly re-
spected and confirmed the doctrine established by those laws. Prior to the Code,
the law recognized six kinds of substitutions, namely: the vulgar, pupillary, ex-
emplary, fideicommissary, breviloqua and reciprocal. The first (vulgar) was the
substitution which any testator could make of the heir instituted in case the latter
did not become such; the second (pupillary) was that which a parent made by
naming a substitute for his minor son in case the latter, having become heir,
should die before reaching the age of puberty, and to acquire, therefore, the right
to testate in his place; the third (exemplary) was that made by ascendants by
naming substitutes for those heirs who would have the right to inherit from
them, but who might, because of insanity, be unable to make a testament, in case
they should die before having recovered their sanity and without having made a
testament previous to the insanity or during a lucid interval; the fourth (fidei-
commissary), also referred to by the writers as indirect, took place when the
testator instituted a person as his heir charging this person to return the inheri-
tance to another either in whole or in part; the fifth, also called compendiosa,
was the consolidation into one document of several of the substitutions above men-
tioned; and the last took place when several instituted heirs were substituted
inter sesse.
As can be seen from the above, the six kinds of substitutions recognized by
the former legislation can be reduced to the four first cited, since the last two are
only modifications of the others. These four original forms of substitutions are
the subject of the section of the Code we will presently examine ...
ARTICULO 774
Puede el testador sustituir una o mas personas al heredero o herederos institui-
dos para el caso en quo mueran antes quo 6l, o no quieran, o no puedan aceptar
la herencia.
La sustitucidn simple, v sin expresion de casos, comprende los tres expresados
en el pdrrafo anterior, a menes que el testador haya dispuesto lo contrario.
(The testator may substitute one or more persons in place of the instituted
heir or heirs in case the latter die before him, or in case they be unwilling or
unable to accept the inheritance.
(The simple substitution, without more, includes the three cases stated in the
preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.)
The above article refers to the vulgar substitution which was the first sub-
stitution known to the Roman law and from which it originates, it having been
established for the case where the heir instituted in first place never became
such ...
The legal reason for this kind of substitution, as well as for the others, was
the requirement imposed by Roman law that there should always be a true
heir who would accept the inheritance so that the intention of the testator could
be carried out in its entirety, otherwise, the succession would pass to the heirs
ad-intestato, with the result that the other independent dispositions of the
institution would remain unexecuted. For this reason, and in order to facilitate
the acceptance of the succession, the testator was permitted to substitute, to the
end that if the instituted heir did not come into the inheritance, it could then
pass to the one called in his place. ...
ARTICULO 775
Los padres y demds aseendientes podrdn nombrar sustitutos a sus descendien-
tes menores de catorce aios, de ambos sexos, para el caso de que mueran antes
de dicha edad.
(Parents and other ascendants may name substitutes for their descendants
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of both sexes under fourteen years of age, in case the latter should die before
reaching that age.)
The precepts of this article have reference to the pupillary substitution whereby
it can be said that the father makes his own, as well as his minor child's testa-
ment, since he actually names an heir for him. This kind of substitution was
established by Roman law after the vulgar substitution, to take care of the
situation where the instituted heir who became such should die intestate, not
having yet reached the age of puberty ...
ARTICULO 776
El ascendiente podrd nombrar sustitutos al deseendiente mayor do catorce
aaos, que, conforme a derecho, haya sido declarado incapaz par enajenaci6n
mental.
La sustituti6n de que habla de pdrrafo anterior quedard sin efecto por el
testamento de incapacitado hecho durante un intervalo lucido o despues de haber
recobrado la raz6n.
(An ascendant may name substitutes for the descendant over fourteen years
of age, who in accordance with law, has been declared mentally incapable.
(The substitution spoken of in the preceding paragraph will be rendered
ineffective if the incapable makes a testament during a lucid interval or after
having regained his reason.)
In addition to the vulgar and pupillary substitutions, the Code has equally
recognized the so-called exemplary substitution, also known by the name of
quasi-pupillary because of its resemblance with the former, and this article of
the Code regulates this form of substitution.
This substitution was established by Justinian, in imitation of the pupillary
substitution to take care of the case where the instituted heir died in a state of
incapacity which prevented him from making his own testament. Si haeres erit
in furore decesserit. As in the case of the pupillary substitution, the substitute
here takes the estate of the testator and that of the incapable, if the latter dies
without having made a testament ...
ARTICULo 777
Las sustituciones de que hablan los dos articulos anteriores cuando el susti-
tuido tenga herederos forzados solo serdn vdlidas en cuanto no periudiquen los
derechos legitimarios de dstos.
(When the person substituted has forced heirs, the substitutions spoken of
in the two preceding articles will be valid only insofar as they do not prejudice
the lgitime rights of such heirs.)
Since the substitution was established in its various forms for the purpose
of avoiding intestacy, it should be understood that they could not be admitted
to the prejudice of any third person having l6gitime rights to the inheritance, and
the above article so provides, by recognizing the lgitime rights which have always
deserved the consideration of the lawmaker, and which cannot be diminished nor
affected in the least, not subjected to any condition ...
ARTICULO 781
Las sustituciones fideicomisarias en cuya virtud se encarge al heredero que
conserve y transmita a un tercero el todo o parte de la herencia, serdn validas V
surtirdn efeato simpre que no pasen del segundo grada, o quo se hagan a favor
de personas que vivian al tiempo del fallecimiento del testador.
(Fideicommissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to
preserve and transmit to a third party the whole or a part of the inheritance
shall be valid and shall have effect provided they do not extend beyond the
second degree, or provided they are made in favor of persons living at the
time of the death of the testator.)
This article and the five that follow have reference to the substitution fidei-
commissaria, which has been the subject of the principal reforms introduced by
the Code on the matter of substitutions.
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The substitution is called fideicommissary or indirect when the testator in-
stitutes a person as his heir charging him to return to another the whole or part
of the inheritance. The heir instituted under such a condition is called the
fiduciary heir, and he who is to receive from him the property of the testator is
known as the fideicomaissary.
The given definition permits us to distinguish the differences existing between
the ancient fideicommissa and those recognized by modern laws, for the former
were considered as universal modes of acquiring the inheritance, and the latter
are only kinds or special forms of substitutions.
Roman in origin, the fideicommissa became obligatory during the time of
Augustus, and although it was accepted by custom before then, it was not given
legal recognition until that time; its advent was due to the difficulties encoun-
tered in the confection of testaments due to the solemn formalities required, and
the inability of the greater number of citizens to comply with these requirements.
By virtue of the fideicommissa, the fiduciary heir became obligated to deliver
the inheritance to the fideicommissary, thus discharging the will of the testator
(fideicomitente), in order to do which he had to make an inventory of all the
property received.
Law 14 of Title 5 of Partida 6 recognized this institution, and by Law 8 of
Title 11 of the same Partida, effect was given to the Senadoconsulto Trebelidnico
whereby, in order to stimulate the acceptance of the inheritance in the fideicom-
missary substitution, the fiduciary heir was given the right to retain for himself
the fourth part of the property comprised in the inheritance before transmitting
it to the fideicommissary. . ..
